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SHOULD JAPAN BECOME A NORMAL COUNTRY?

by

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December 2005

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SHOULD JAPAN BECOME A NORMAL COUNTRY?

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis evaluates Japanese geopolitical change in the post-Cold War era. It does so by analyzing Japan's history, its foreign policy since 1945, its reasons for becoming a normal country, and the impact of its normalization. This thesis makes three arguments. First, Japan, although its history is replete with internal rivalry and conflict, never displayed an aggressive foreign policy with expansionist and adventurist characteristics—with the exception of an insignificant expedition to Korea in the 1590s—before the Meiji Restoration. Second, Japan should become a normal country because it would advance Japan's regional leadership, increase the likelihood of Japan's accession to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, and improve its economy in both the short and the long run. Finally, no significant barrier stands against Japanese normalization; however, Japan must follow cautious and amicable relations with China and the two Koreas in order to achieve normalcy. In conclusion, the thesis makes policy recommendations for Japan and the United States regarding Japanese normalization.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. SITUATION

1. Cold War Context

Japan's politics, foreign relations, and economy stabilized after the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1951. Domestically, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a largely conservative institution, which established close links with the bureaucracy on the one hand, and the business interests, on the other, controlled the government. Under this regime, the Japanese economy flourished. Externally, the consequence was a close link with the United States. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, negotiated at the same time as the peace treaty, gave Japan the protection of a nuclear umbrella in a divided world. The partnership also provided Japan in its early years with access to American capital and technology. Although the relationship was not always smooth, its continuation was naturally presumed by both parties for more than two decades.¹

2. Post-Cold War Japan

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War raised many questions in Japan about the assumptions that the American alliance was instituted upon. In addition to such questions, Japan's boom years suddenly ended, plunging the country into its most painful recession since the aftermath of the Second World War. It also threatened the political settlement of 1955, under which the LDP has assured its power in governance.²

3. The Question of Normal Japan

Although it has been around since the 1960s in different forms, the question of "normal Japan" reached high levels in the post-Cold War era, especially after 1993, when Ichiro Ozawa stated it outspokenly. The United States and the rest of the western world have been urging Japan to share the

¹ W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change since 1850*, revised ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 278.

² Ibid, 279.

burden of global security because Japan stands tall as one of the few economic superpowers in the world. In this context, how to strengthen the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and participate in foreign peacekeeping missions have become significant policy debates in Japan. Along the same lines, revision of the Japanese constitution, particularly to change the war-renouncing Article 9, has become a topic of heated discussion in Japan.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War came to a screeching and unexpected halt. In the following years, Japan faced significant economic and political problems, which made the 1990s a “lost decade” in Japan. The economic recession that Japan slithered into in the early 1990s continues to inflict economic pain in Japan even today. In 1993, the end of the miracle economy and other reasons led to the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) losing that year’s election, ending a 38-year reign over Japan.³ This compelled the LDP to join in a coalition government, which for a while was headed by a socialist prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi. By 1996, the LDP was returned to power as a majority party under the leadership of Hashimoto Ryutaro. The party was practically unopposed until 1998, when the opposition Democratic Party of Japan was formed.⁴ Since then, the opposition has been gaining momentum. Today, the government is led by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, holding office since 2001, who is a member of the Liberal Democratic Party.⁵ He made a radical change toward normalcy which allowed for members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to be sent to Iraq.

Today, the ruling coalition is formed by the conservative LDP and also the New Clean Government Party (*Shin Komeito*).⁶ The significance of these

³ “A History of the Liberal Democratic Party,” in *Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Official Website*, available at <http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/index.html>, accessed on 30 October 2005.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ “List of Koizumi Cabinet members,” in *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/cabinet_e.html, accessed on 1 November 2005.

political events influences Japanese normalization. Japan with its location, economic power, and military strength shall remain at the center of this assessment of Japanese normalcy; however, because Japan is seriously concerned that most of its neighbors discourage Japan from becoming a normal world political power, this issue also shall be assessed.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Japanese geopolitical change in the post-Cold War era. When Japan lost the war in 1945, it surrendered unconditionally to the United States. Thus, a new constitution was put in place with Article 9 roughly stating that Japan could not have any military of significant size other than a small, administrative structure. The defense and security of Japan have been substantially provided by the United States since then. Japan went through a serious rebuilding process after World War II. The United States was the major benefactor in rebuilding Japan through the 1950s and the 1960s. In the 1970s, Japan emerged as a new economic giant, and in the 1980s, Japan was one of the four richest countries in the world. Japan since World War II has gone through so many serious political and social changes that almost all nations in the world, including the United States, are certain that the chance of Japan going back to fascism is virtually nonexistent. With all these facts at hand and with the end of the Cold War, the security of Japan has taken a different outlook. Recently, the issue of Japanese strengthening the Self-Defense Force and rearmament has come up, and the United States has encouraged Japan to become its own provider of security. By strengthening its military forces, Japan could become a “normal” country again. This thesis will seek to answer whether or not Japan should become a normal country.

C. IMPORTANCE

Japan is one of the great economic leaders in the world. It is the most important ally of the United States in East Asia. As a result of its constitution, Japan’s defense and security was substantially provided by the United States, so Japan never had to build a large enough military to provide entirely for its own defense. Since the end of the Cold War, potential rearmament of Japan has

become an important issue. The cost of providing Japanese defense is large, and the United States is willing to turn over more of the burden for defense of Japan to the Japanese.

Increasingly, Japan is willing to assume a more active part in the security issues of the world. With limited serious military power, however, Japan cannot take a regional lead with global significance and cannot become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. If Japan wants to take an active part in the stabilization of its region and emerge as a democratic leader in Asia without depending on the American security umbrella, then the Japanese decision makers have to take serious steps in rearmament. These steps could benefit Japan not only in political terms, but also in economic terms in the long run, yet it could also trigger major changes in regional security dynamics. This thesis will analyze the political and strategic changes in post-Cold War Japan so far and the likely consequences of a constitutional change (Article IX). It will provide an analysis of Japanese foreign policy goals and the Japanese view of America and its foreign policy. Using the tools provided by realist, liberal, and domestic politics traditions, this thesis will also draw on international relations theory to assess the consequences of Japanese rearmament and the strengthening of military forces.

D. MAJOR QUESTIONS

This thesis aims to answer three major questions. First, what is the historical context of Japanese normalization? Second, should Japan become a normal country or should it avoid that option? Third, what are the likely impacts and consequences of Japanese normalization? This question further analyzes the international consequences of Japanese normalization to include its impact on regional stability and prosperity and its effects on US-Japan relations.

E. MAJOR ARGUMENTS

This thesis argues that Japan will benefit from becoming a normal nation in four different ways. It will help stabilize its region, it will improve its economic well-being in the long run, it will become fully independent, and it will provide its

own security, which will give more flexibility to its foreign policy. By doing so, Japan will also become a potential regional center of power and will drastically increase its chances of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The thesis also makes use of the main international relations theories in an attempt to show why Japan should normalize. Japanese normalization will benefit Japan's regional leadership with global economic significance, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and economic benefits that in the short and long run all depend on Japan's ability to assert itself more proactively in East Asia.

F. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This is a policy analysis research project. The methodology used in this thesis is an analysis of possible outcomes using current and past trends regarding the revision of the Japanese constitution and therefore expansion of the allowed and accepted role and capacity of Japan's defense structure as well as its use of military power. The research heavily depends on historical patterns in the development of Japanese foreign policy.

Sources include official documents and publications by the Japanese government, statements by Japanese officials, and agreements between the United States and Japan. News releases, past and present, supplemented by the secondary writings of academic specialists are analyzed as this is an ongoing issue.

Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, this thesis describes the problems facing modern day Japan, specifically about normalization. It uses historical data to outline how the situation has developed into what it is today. In addition, it makes use of a combination of primary and secondary sources to discuss the relationship between the United States and Japan, looking back on the previous relations of the two nations. In the end, this thesis aims to explain Japanese normalization and makes a policy recommendation about whether it should or should not normalize.

G. ORGANIZATION

The research will first situate Japan in historical context and will analyze the details of the recent events that not only took place in Japan, but also around the globe in general. It then will assess Japanese normalization, which will be followed by an analysis of the impacts of Japanese normalization. The thesis will conclude with policy recommendations for both Japan and the United States.

Chapter II provides a brief historical background on Japan including its early history through the Cold War.

Chapter III describes Japan's foreign policy outlook during the post-Cold War era and analyzes Japanese politics in the context of normalization.

Chapter IV explains the reasons for Japanese normalization. These reasons are the stability of the region, long-term economic benefits, full independence with the prospects of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and independence in defense decision-making with a larger area of flexibility in politics and strategy. This chapter also assesses how Japan could implement a policy to become a normal country.

Chapter V analyzes the impacts of a normal Japan on world affairs at large. This chapter reviews the economic, military-political, and diplomatic impacts of Japanese normalization. The regional impacts and the global significance of Japanese normalization are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter VI will conclude with a summary of findings and assessments as well as providing a summary judgment on Japanese normalization. It will also make policy recommendations for Japan in regards to normalization. In addition, it will state the consequences of a normal Japan, and will also make policy recommendations for the United States.

II. MODERN JAPAN: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is not only to assess Japanese history in order to present a chronological perspective of Japan in general, but also to reveal that Japanese history, although replete with internal rivalry and conflict, never displayed an aggressive foreign policy with expansionist and adventurist characteristics—with the exception of an insignificant expedition to Korea in the 1590s—before the Meiji Restoration. Japan, a transliterationist⁷ imitator of the Western world aiming to raise itself to an equal footing with the rest of the imperialist, expansionist, and opportunist great powers in the then-international balance of power system followed a flawed path of modernization, which in turn brought its demise at the end of the Second World War. The imperialist balance of world power was in substantial decay following the Great Depression. This decay also brought the entire balancing powers of Europe to their knees, and some fell flat on their faces, countries that included Germany and France. Japanese aggression in the 1930s and the first part of the 1940s and its demise at the end of the Second World War were no different from the fate of the many European powers of that time. What made Japan significantly successful and prominent, however, was its reversion back to non-aggressive and knowledge-and-advancement-seeking internal and external policies in the postwar years. The lessons Japanese learned as a result of the aggressive 1930s and the warring 1940s have been so well engrained in their culture and so well instilled in their minds that the world should not expect harm but expect to benefit greatly from a normal, assertive, and objective Japan mobilizing its latent economic

⁷ The expression “transliterationist” is used in particular to demonstrate that Japan, historically, has Japanized the outside influence and foreign encroachment on itself. The distinction between translation and transliteration differentiates the Japanese way of being influenced by outsiders. In this context, I describe those who simply imitate others as “translationists” and who make use of outside influence by incorporating it into its own cultural, social, political, and economic practices as “transliterationists.” Japanese fit into the second category. For a larger definition, see Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 1-18 and 514-539.

power to help the stabilizing powers of the world to further advance stability, peace, and world harmony. In turn, this will help increase the welfare of not only the Japanese but also the citizens of the rest of the world. This chapter and the following chapter will present a picture of the externally peaceful Japan while carefully noting the exception of the anomalous years following the enthronement of Emperor Meiji and ending with the Japanese defeat at the end of the Second World War.

A. GENERAL

1. Geography and People

Few countries around the world have the allure of Japan. Lush, green hillsides, meticulous farming, creative gardens, and chivalrous people combine to create a pleasant landscape.⁸ Called *Nihon or Nippon Koku* (Land of the Rising Sun) in Japanese and with a total size of 377,835 square kilometers, Japan is an archipelago of mountainous islands with numerous dormant and active volcanoes and is generally rainy with high levels of humidity.⁹ It consists of four large islands—Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku—and about 3,409 smaller islands, which only constitute three percent of the Japanese land.¹⁰ In the north, Japan is bounded by the Sea of Okhotsk, where the narrow La Perouse Strait separates it from the southern tip of the Soviet island, Sakhalin. The Sea of Japan is on the west, and the Korea Strait lies between South Korea and Japan. To the south extends the East China Sea, and to the east the Pacific Ocean. Over two thirds of Japan's land area is mountainous with a scarcity of lowlands, which represent only about 29 percent of the entire area.¹¹ In these relatively small areas live the people of the eleventh most populous country in the

⁸ George B. Cressey, *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, 3rd Ed., (New York, London, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), 198.

⁹ Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden eds., *Japan: A Country Study*, 5th Ed., (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992). Also available on-line. "Japan: A Country Study," *The Library of Congress, Country Studies*, On-line book, available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc.html>, accessed on 5 June 2005.

¹⁰ Cressey, 209.

¹¹ Robert H. Taylor, ed., *Handbooks to the Modern World: Asia and the Pacific*, (New York and Oxford: Facts on File, 1991), 125.

world¹² and rests the world's most sophisticated electronics industry.¹³ Nearly forty-five percent of the population is concentrated in the three metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya.¹⁴

2. Recent Transformation

Japan is governed under the constitution of 1947, the emperor is the head and the symbol of state with no governing powers, and the chief executive is the prime minister selected from the Diet—a bicameral legislative body, which consists of a House of Councilors (upper house) and a House of Representatives (lower house).¹⁵ Japan is divided into forty-seven administrative divisions, each headed by a popularly elected governor.¹⁶ Although significant in its own way, Japanese history before the Tokugawa era does not appear critically important for this study, and thus it is examined very minimally. Throughout this time, there were numerous feudal battles as various factions within the country vied for power. With the Meiji Restoration, however, Japan changed drastically.

Japan entered into the modern era in 1868 when its strongest “*han*”s (feudal fiefdoms) wanted to create a national government. Young members of the military oligarchy dismantled the shogunate system, installed Emperor Meiji on the throne, and launched a vast program of industrialization and modernization.¹⁷ In order to accomplish their goals, they made use of two unique characteristics of Japan: the emperor and the Shinto culture. These two characteristics helped Japanese leaders create a national identity which led to a significant modernization effort and produced a Western-type, strong nation while

¹² “Rank Order-Population,” *The World Factbook*, CIA, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html>, accessed on 15 October 2005. Note: On this webpage, Japan is rank ordered twelfth including the European Union (EU) in the list. This thesis does not recognize the EU as a country in the traditional sense.

¹³ Taylor, 126.

¹⁴ Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book.

¹⁵ “Japan,” *The World Factbook*, CIA, available at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html>, accessed on 15 October 2005.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Taylor, 129.

the rest of Asia was suffering from imperialist encroachment and a lack of modernity. This so-called Meiji Restoration transformed Japan from a feudal state into a major modern power. The rest of this section will cover Japanese history before the end of the Cold War in an effort to set the stage for and explain the initiation of the normalization debate.

B. ANCIENT JAPAN: ORIGINS AND ASUKA, NARA, AND HEIAN PERIODS

Japanese culture emerged on Yamato plain around the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. and continued to gradually expand to the entire archipelago. In this period, the Japanese created a centralized state reinforced by the adoption of a Chinese style political organization. In this context, a cultural and social transformation, as well as the introduction of new features including foreign borrowing, the adoption of Buddhism, and the practice of writing took place. The metamorphosis occurred under conditions that suited Japanese preferences and realities. Among the lasting features that appeared in this era were Japan's imperial lineage, the Shinto tradition, adoption of a Chinese-style state apparatus with Confucian ideological foundations, the consolidation of aristocratic politics, and the emergence of full-blown feudalism that created the stage for military governments under shoguns.¹⁸

1. Origins

Three categories of evidence—mythical, historical records of foreign observers, and modern archaeology—paints a picture of the origins and the rise of Japanese civilization. Evidence indicates that human presence in Japan dates back to the Stone Age, but Jomon culture dates back to 8-10,000 BCE. During the Jomon Period, the inhabitants of the Japanese islands were gatherers, fishers and hunters. Jomon is the name of the era's pottery. Following this period was the Yayoi culture with distinctive Bronze Age characteristics. The

¹⁸John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 324-357.

Yamato state emerged with the unique characteristic of a full-blown confederation of tribal states (*kuni*).¹⁹

2. Early Japanese State

The rulers of Yamato established an overarching monarchical lineage by the 5th-6th centuries linking other clans (*uji*) through alliances of various sorts.²⁰ It is during this time that the imperial lineage and the Shinto tradition start to emerge. Records show that in 646 A.D., leaders of the Yamato family purportedly issued the Taika Reform Edict and eventually established their authority as a hereditary line of Heavenly Sovereigns.²¹ Thereafter, Japanese history is periodized according to the location of the imperial capital or the shogunate's capital. During the *Asuka* period, the Japanese capital rotated among settlements in this region until the capital was established in *Nara*, which started the 75-year long *Nara* period in 710 CE. In 712, historians of the Yamato family finished compiling the *Kojiki*, the record of ancient matters.²² Immediately following this era was the *Heian* period during which the imperial court moved to a new, permanent capital at *Heian*, now called Kyoto.²³ The latter part of the *Heian* period is often referred to as the *Fujiwara* period after the lineage of court aristocrats who dominated the imperial court from 858 to 1160.²⁴ In short, throughout this period, a Japanese imperial system with Shinto and Buddhist authority was established, a system of domination of the imperial system by aristocratic clans emerged, major cultural strands were consolidated, and the imperial power was devolved into feudalism.²⁵

¹⁹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 325-329.

²⁰ Ibid, 330-334.

²¹ James McClain, *Japan: A Modern History*, (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002), 2.

²² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 329.

²³ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 337.

²⁴ Ibid, 351.

²⁵ McClain, 11-15.

C. FEUDAL JAPAN

1. Origins of Feudalism

For all its cultural brilliance, the Fujiwara court was not the direct ancestor of later Japanese society.²⁶ It had grown too weak to survive as the dominant culture. It served as a transmitter of its unique culture to another more vigorous group—the provincial warrior class. The provincial aristocracy that emerged during this period is referred to as the *bushi* or *samurai* class of warriors. It is important to note that feudalism in Japan seems to have resulted from administrative and legal institutions surviving from a centralized state—derived from a Chinese type of organization of the Nara period—and a system of personal bonds of loyalty, an earlier familial pattern of *uji* society.²⁷

2. Feudal Regimes

Three regimes—Taira, Kamakura, and Ashikaga—emerged during the subsequent period, none of which were thoroughly centralized. After fierce fighting, in 1160, Taira Kiyomori prevailed for the next 30 years.²⁸ Following four centuries of a rather traditional period, in 1192, Minamoto Yoritomo was appointed the *sei tai shogun* (Great Barbarian-Quelling General).²⁹ He established his “tent government” at Kamakura, which was the strongest among the three aforementioned regimes, but was only effective for about 60 years from 1220s until the Mongol invasions and their aftermath.³⁰ Japan faced two invasion attempts by the armies of Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor and the grandson of Genghis Khan, in 1274 and 1281, both of which were obstructed by the typhoon gales known as *kamikaze*—divine winds—which ravaged the Mongol fleets and saved Japan from invasion.³¹ In 1333, Ashikaga Takauji

²⁶ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 358.

²⁷ Ibid, 358-361.

²⁸ McClain, 16.

²⁹ McClain, 16.

³⁰ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 363.

³¹ McClain, 17.

overthrew the Minamoto shogunate and became the shogun.³² Over time, local authorities evolved into autonomous regional units by the late 15th and 16th centuries called the *han*, which were presided over by aristocratic lords called the *daimyo*. These leaders presided over the associated warriors—the *samurai*—and administered the populace and resources of their domains. Warfare among these domains was incessant. After the Onin War among the military leaders in Kyoto during 1467-1477, warfare in the competing *daimyo* resulted in a century of perpetual conflict, named by the Japanese the “warring states” (*sengoku*) period. In this period, effective overarching governance by the Ashikaga shoguns was completely absent.³³

3. Initial Contact with Europeans

In 1543, the first Portuguese traders landed on the island of Tanegashima, south of Kyushu, and only six years later did Francis Xavier inaugurate the first Christian Mission to Japan. In 1571, the daimyo Omura Sumitada opened Nagasaki to Portuguese shipping.³⁴

D. TOKUGAWA JAPAN

1. Establishing the Tokugawa Regime

The Tokugawa military regime arose from this context. The peculiar political order of Tokugawa Japan was the product of a long evolution, which reflected four characteristics. First, centralized political authority using Chinese institutions failed and the power of local and regional military aristocratic elites grew steadily. Second, as the imperial power withered, local politics was militarized, which created a segmented order presided over by a warrior caste. Third, decentralization of political and economic activity to regional and local levels created feudalism. Finally, national unity emerged in the hands of a succession of military regimes that claimed to govern in the name of the emperor. The founder of this order, Tokugawa Ieyasu, built his regime on the

³² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 376.

³³ Ibid, 375-384.

³⁴ Ibid, 393-4.

efforts at unification of two military predecessors: Oda Nobunaga (1560s-1582) and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1582-1598). Tokugawa Ieyasu had been one of Hideyoshi's principal generals.³⁵

In 1573, the warlord Oda Nobunaga drove the Ashikaga shogun to exile, burned almost the entire city of Kyoto,³⁶ and won a decisive victory at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575 after using Western style firearms in battle.³⁷ In 1582, Nobunaga died,³⁸ and was succeeded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who hammered the daimyo into submission.³⁹ After almost a decade later in 1590, Tokugawa Ieyasu transferred his domain to the Kanto region and began to construct the Edo Castle.⁴⁰ Two years later, Hideyoshi initiated a major conquest campaign against Korea and his armies landed at Pusan. He died in 1598, which resulted in Japanese armies' retreat from Korean land. In 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu, after a two-year power struggle against a coalition of opponents, prevailed at the Battle of Sekigahara, and on the twelfth day of the second month in 1603, the Heavenly Sovereign recognized Tokugawa Ieyasu's achievement by elevating him to the office of shogun,⁴¹ which marked the beginning of a two and a half centuries long period of isolation.⁴²

2. Regime's Source of Power

Tokugawa Ieyasu's regime unified Japan and established an order that provided a prolonged period of peace and political stability—lasting into the 19th

³⁵ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 392-434. Also see McClain, 5-10 and 36-47.

³⁶ McClain, 18.

³⁷ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 396.

³⁸ There are two historical accounts of Nobunaga's death. The first claim is that he was killed by a traitorous vassal. The second one claims that he was wounded by a treacherous vassal, and he withdrew to the hall of worship. He eviscerated himself rather than dying at the hands of another. There is also disambiguation as to whether he died in 1581 or 1582, but most accounts cite 1582 as his year of death. For more details, see McClain, 19.

³⁹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 396.

⁴⁰ McClain, 20.

⁴¹ Although the Heavenly Sovereign recognized Tokugawa Ieyasu as the shogun, this was only ceremonial. In reality, the emperor was under the shogun's control.

⁴² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 397.

century—but it rested on the autonomous *han* administrations. So long as the surviving *daimyo* (the chief of a *han*) did not challenge Tokugawa supremacy, the regime did not intrude on their authority in administering their *han*. Thus, the Tokugawa regime was something less than a full-scale national government. Its authority rested on its claim to speak for the emperor, whose court still resided in the traditional capital of Kyoto. Its power rested on the superiority of its military forces, and behind that, its economic resources. The Tokugawa regime sustained its power and maintained stability for such a long period because ultimately, it was a conservative, security-focused order preoccupied with security against subversion throughout its politics, institutions, and policies. This was a natural result of the initial establishment of the regime by military means in a struggle for power among contending *han*. It is important to note that to sustain their *bakufu* or tent government, a term used to describe the temporary location of the governing regime, the Tokugawa leaders focused on the prevention of overthrow by the same tactics that had brought them to power. Also equally important is to note the Tokugawa's legacy of economic, social, and intellectual trends in early modern Japan.⁴³

3. Consequences

The Tokugawa's success created a long period of peace and stability, which in turn promoted dramatic economic development that built on trends emerging from the medieval period that preceded Japan's modernization. Japan's lightning modernization after 1868 was made possible because the Tokugawa order already created many essential elements of modernization. Therefore, the Tokugawa period is also referred to as Japan's early modern period. In this context, medieval economic trends flourished under regional specialization, monetization of the economy, expansion of a market system, and growth of cities mainly as the unanticipated economic consequences of conservative Confucian Tokugawa policies. With the aforementioned economic change, there came inevitable social changes, which gave rise to merchants, a

⁴³ McClain, 20-36.

vigorous urban culture, and partial decline of the warrior class. The intellectual trends surfaced in three currents in this period: Confucianism, Dutch learning (*rangaku*), and national learning (*kokugaku*). These trends had significant long-term implications. First, an awakening of interest in Shinto as Japan's true, essential tradition became widespread. Second, perceptions of the imperial line as the true center of Japan's political life emerged. Third, a proto-nationalistic sense of Japaneseness took root.⁴⁴ For instance, by 1700, Edo became so large that it was said to be the largest city of its time in the world,⁴⁵ and that Japanese development continued so swiftly that by 1839, at least 300 private academies were in operation in Japan.⁴⁶ These trends laid the foundations for a sweeping change in the later 19th century.

E. MEIJI RESTORATION

1. Early Motives

From the turn of the century, especially in the 1840s, the Western countries demanded more and more insistently that Japan end its isolation from the West⁴⁷ and open up its markets to their goods. In this context, Japan emerged from the long seclusion and began a program of integration into the system of nation-states created by the West. Japan's success at this was nothing short of spectacular. By the end of the 19th century, Japan had undergone a revolutionary change of regime from the conservative Tokugawa shogunate to an emerging democracy under a Western-style constitution, had begun to roll back the unequal treaties imposed on it in the 1850s, and acquired the economic and the military strength to make it an emerging power in East Asia and the Pacific, a power that defeated China in 1895 and then Russia in 1905—the first non-Western power to defeat a Western one. The success of Japan in all these respects makes what is conventionally called the “Meiji Restoration” the de facto “Meiji Revolution” in evolutionary terms.

⁴⁴ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 318-330.

⁴⁵ McClain, 4.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Japan was isolated except for limited contact with the Dutch.

2. Fall of Tokugawa

To understand this rapid evolution, one must recall several events and trends from the late Tokugawa era and understand several economic and social trends that undermined the Tokugawa regime's conservative politics and policies. These were the rise of the merchant and artisan urban classes, the transformation of samurai into urban bureaucrats, the decline of daimyo and samurai livelihoods and rising indebtedness to merchants, and the social tensions in the rural villages. In this context, recurrent reform movements sought to alleviate some of these strains in Tokugawa governance by reasserting the regime's initial agrarian conservative posture—*Kyoho* reforms, *Sadanobu's* reforms, and *Tempo* reforms are examples of such attempts—yet these attempts met with Western encroachment and were fruitless.⁴⁸

3. American Intervention

Into this domestic context entered the American Commodore Matthew C. Perry, whose arrival constitutes the first attempt to “open” Japan. Perry's visit to Edo Bay in 1853, bearing a letter from President Millard Fillmore, marked the beginning of a fifteen-year period called the *bakumatsu*, or “end of shogunate.”⁴⁹ Subsequently, the treaty of Kanagawa was signed in 1854, which reflected the U.S. needs in the region.⁵⁰ U.S. Consul Townsend Harris at Shimoda patiently negotiated broader treaties in July 1858.⁵¹

In the short span of five years, Japan's exclusion policy became history, and it had acceded to its incorporation into the Western-dominated international system. It had done so since the *bakufu* and many daimyo understood the superior military power of the West, and they were aware of China's failure to resist the demands of the West in the first Opium War. On a further note, the

⁴⁸ Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 66-75.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 68.

⁵⁰ Daniel S. Papp, L. K. Johnson, and J. E Endicott, *American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy*, (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 85.

⁵¹ Arthur Power Dudden, *The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 136-137.

impact of Japan's opening was nothing short of revolutionary. In the period of 15 years from Perry's first visit, the Tokugawa bakufu was defunct, a new regime led by young samurai from outlying *han*—mainly Choshu, Satsuma, and Tosa—acting in the name of the Emperor Meiji was in place in Edo/Tokyo, the regime embarked on a series of rapid modernization programs that over the course of the next generation turned Japan into a regional power, and the regime had sent out its first diplomatic mission in 1871—the Ikuwara mission—that began Japan's efforts to take its place in the Western-created international system and to overturn the impairment of Japanese sovereignty under the Perry and Harris treaties. Thus began the Meiji Restoration at the end of *bakumatsu*.⁵²

Domestically, the impact of Perry's visit and the treaties he and Townsend Harris negotiated with Edo triggered a complicated struggle for power that ultimately brought down the *bakufu*. By referring the question of how to respond to the Perry letter to all the *daimyo* and referring the treaty to the imperial court for the Emperor's endorsement, the shogunate itself unintentionally helped to create the context in which this struggle for power played out.⁵³

4. Revolutionary Beginning

After an inconclusive period of competition among the *han*, the outer *han* agreed to collaborate against the shogunate, which was embodied in the Satsuma-Choshu alliance of March 1866, setting the stage for the demise of the shogunate. The "opening" of Japan thus generated a political crisis domestically: it provided the opportunity for long-building political tensions in the Tokugawa structure to play out, which in turn created the foundations of a new political order. The Meiji Restoration produced Japan under a new leadership with a relatively clearly defined agenda. The agenda of the new government was announced in the Charter Oath of 8 April 1868, which called for dissolving the

⁵² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 486-496.

⁵³ McClain, 134-152.

Tokugawa class restrictions, making decisions through public discussions, and seeking knowledge throughout the world in order to build a rich nation and a strong army.⁵⁴

5. Revolution in Place

Once in power in 1868-1869, the Meiji regime perceived Japan as weak and the West as strong, and thus it was established in an insecure international context. Although Japan faced no immediate enemy at this time, it was less than fully sovereign because of the Western international order and unequal treaties. The regime recognized in its early stages that success was intimately bound to sweeping changes necessary to strengthen Japan domestically. The 1871-1873 Iwakura mission to the United States and several European states reinforced this impression. When the Iwakura mission realized the scale of changes necessary to acquire co-equal status in the Western system, Japan began a concerted effort in the mid-1870s to make changes along such lines. A westernization craze was taking place in Japan during the 1880s and 1890s, and only after the adoption of the 1889 constitution and the election of the first Diet in 1890 did Britain finally agree to negotiate revisions in the treaties. Japan's second-class status ended in the international order after it recovered its tariff autonomy in 1911. It would not be an overestimation to conclude that these changes were driven by Japan's perceptions of the challenges it faced in the international setting.⁵⁵

6. Transformation

In this period, the Meiji Restoration accomplished political transformation, military transformation, economic transformation, and social and cultural transformation in order to bring Japan into the Western international arena as a co-equal power.⁵⁶ The political change was evident because from the Tokugawa limited state, Japan became a modern nation with the monopoly of use of force

⁵⁴ Duus, 85-89.

⁵⁵ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 501-523.

⁵⁶ William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13-19.

vested in the central government. The 1889 constitution and creation of democratic forms of governance clearly indicate that Japan went through a thorough political transformation undertaken mainly by the leadership of the Meiji government, who dominated the political scene until 1910, effectively running Japan as an oligarchy despite the powers of the Diet after 1889. Clarity of purpose that was apparent in the effort to build a modern state was also clearly visible in Meiji military reforms, which aimed to build a modern, national military that departed radically from the regionalized patterns of the past. The Meiji government also transformed the economy by effective taxation, a national *yen*-based currency system, creation of strategic industries, and creation of military industry, all of which in turn drastically increased the economic resources of state power. In the cultural and social realm, Japan was quickly able to dissolve the Tokugawa class restrictions, gradually create legal reforms based on rights, and ensure compulsory education. In the end, it is clear that the Meiji restoration resulted in Japan's emergence as a modern nation and a major imperialist world power in the early 20th century.⁵⁷

7. Consequences

It is arguable, however, whether these sweeping reforms set the stage for first, the Taisho democracy, and then later, the Japanese Empire at war. Three views emerged to explain the consequences of the restoration. The first one, Meiji confidence and pan-Asianism, posits that Tokyo simply followed the Western model of the other great powers. A second viewpoint, Japan's flawed modernization, asserts that the Meiji oligarchs' modernization was inherently flawed since it fostered an expansionist Japan void of constitutional checks and balances. A third view claims that Japan acted to secure its periphery in an era of accelerating great power competition.⁵⁸ The important point here is that without understanding the Meiji restoration, it is almost impossible to interpret Japan's history and foreign policy.

⁵⁷ Duus, 86-102. Also see Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 523-557.

⁵⁸ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 648-650.

F. TAISHO DEMOCRACY

1. End of Genro Dominance

In 1912 emperor Meiji died, and the era of the ruling clique of elder statesmen (*genro*) was about to end. During the era of the weak emperor Taisho (1912-26), the political power shifted from the genro to the parliament and the parties. Japan's unparalleled success story was accompanied by its promise to live up to its optimistic prospect in the first quarter of the 20th century. By 1925, Japan was far more modernized and much more of a world power than at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. This unparalleled success, however, turned to ashes in the following two decades as a result of Japan's involvement in wars of increasing magnitude.⁵⁹

2. Japan in the First World War

In the First World War, Japan joined the Allied powers, but played only a minor role in fighting German colonial forces in East Asia. Seizing the opportunity of Berlin's distraction with the European War and aiming to expand its sphere of influence in China, Japan declared war on Germany in August 1914 and quickly occupied German territories in China's Shandong Province and the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands in the Pacific. Japan's hegemony in northern China and other parts of Asia was facilitated through two sets of agreements. The first with Russia in 1916 helped further secure Japan's influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The second with France, Britain, and the United States in 1917 recognized Japan's territorial gains in China and the Pacific. Toward the end of the war, Japan increasingly provided materiel for its European allies, thus helping to expand the country's industry, boost its exports, and transform Japan from a debtor to a creditor nation. The year 1919 saw Japan sitting among the great military and industrial powers of the world known as the "Big Five" powers at the Versailles Peace Conference. Tokyo was granted a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. Moreover, the peace treaty confirmed the transfer of Germany's rights in Shandong to

⁵⁹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 650-666.

Japan. Similarly, Germany's former Pacific islands were put under a Japanese mandate.⁶⁰ Less positively, Japan's proposal of amending a "racial equality clause" to the covenant of the League of Nations was rejected by the United States, Britain, and Australia.⁶¹

3. Interwar Years

The post-World War I era brought Japan an unprecedented political prosperity. During the 1920s, Japan progressed toward a democratic system of government in a movement known as "Taisho Democracy." However, parliamentary government was not rooted deeply enough to withstand the economic and political pressures of the late 1920s and 1930s during which military leaders became increasingly influential.⁶² This was mainly due to the contending forces that reached its peak during the reign of weak and mentally-ill Emperor Taisho, which is when political parties grew in importance.⁶³ From 1918 to 1932 is when parties were especially powerful, and prime ministers were selected from among the party leaders;⁶⁴ however, the existing political parties at the time were elite based, rather than mass-based, organizations.⁶⁵ In such a political context, party members worked closely with the military, bureaucracy, and the court, but the political system in Japan was moving towards a democracy with one significant limitation to substantive change: the Meiji constitutional order. Despite the aforementioned order, popular political consciousness was growing, students were active, unions flourished, and reform movements emerged in this

⁶⁰ Dolan and Worden, "Japan: A Country Study," On-line book.

⁶¹ "Japanese History: Militarism and World War II" in *Japan Guide Homepage*, available at <http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2129.html>, accessed on 2 November 2005.

⁶² McClain, 357-397.

⁶³ James Arthur Ainscow (J.A.A.) Stockwin, *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998) 20.

⁶⁴ McCargo, 22.

⁶⁵ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 2nd Ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1996), 159-171.

period. It was rather a significant step towards democracy in 1925 when Japan introduced universal male suffrage, which increased the size of the electorate fourfold to almost 13 million.⁶⁶

4. End of Democracy

However, emerging Chinese nationalism, the victory of the communists in Russia, and the growing presence of the United States in East Asia all worked against Japan's postwar foreign policy interests. In addition, the four-year Siberian expedition and activities in China, combined with big domestic spending programs, had depleted Japan's wartime earnings. Only through more competitive business practices, supported by further economic development and industrial modernization could Japan hope to become predominant in Asia.⁶⁷ On the other hand, in addition to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, in 1928, Japan joined 14 other nations in signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which denounced "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies."⁶⁸ Thus, when Japan invaded Manchuria only three years later, its pretext was the defense of its nationals and economic interests there.

G. JAPANESE EMPIRE

1. The Roots of Imperialism

Ultrnationalism was characteristic of right-wing politicians and conservative military men since the inception of the Meiji Restoration, contributing greatly to the prowar politics of the 1870s. Disenchanted former samurai had established patriotic societies and intelligence-gathering organizations. These groups became active in domestic and foreign politics, helped foment prowar sentiments, and supported ultrnationalist causes through the end of World War II. After Japan's victories over China and Russia, the

⁶⁶ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 694-705.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 705-713.

⁶⁸ "The Avalon Project at Yale Law School," *Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928*, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm>, accessed on 14 October 2005.

ultranationalists concentrated on domestic issues and perceived domestic threats, such as socialism and communism.⁶⁹

After World War I and the intellectual ferment of the period, nationalist societies became numerous but had a minority voice during the era of two-party democratic politics. Diverse and angry groups called for nationalization of all wealth above a fixed minimal amount and for armed overseas expansion. The emperor was highly revered by these groups, and when Hirohito was enthroned in 1927, initiating the Showa period, there were calls for a “Showa Restoration” and a revival of Shinto.⁷⁰ Emperor-centered neo-Shintoism, or State Shinto, which had long been developing, came to fruition in the 1930s and 1940s. It glorified the emperor and traditional Japanese virtues to the exclusion of Western influences, which were perceived as greedy, individualistic, bourgeois, and assertive. The ideals of the Japanese family-state and self-sacrifice in service of the nation were given a missionary interpretation and were thought by their ultranationalist proponents to be applicable to the modern world.⁷¹

2. Slithering into the Second World War

The 1930s were a decade of fear in Japan, characterized by the resurgence of right-wing patriotism, the weakening of democratic forces, domestic terrorist violence, and stepped-up military aggression abroad. A prelude to this state of affairs was Tanaka Giichi's term as prime minister from 1927 to 1929. He sent troops to China twice to obstruct Chiang Kai-shek's unification campaign. In June 1928, adventurist officers of the Guandong Army, the Imperial Japanese Army unit stationed in Manchuria, embarked on unauthorized initiatives. The Japanese system of party government finally met its demise in 1932, when a group of junior naval officers and army cadets assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. Inukai's successors, military men chosen by Saionji, the last surviving *genro*, recognized Manchukuo and generally

⁶⁹ Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, (Harlow England: Pearson Education, 1987), 2-11.

⁷⁰ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 700-702.

⁷¹ Dolan and Worden, “Japan: A Country Study,” On-line book.

approved the army's actions in securing Manchuria as an industrial base, an area for Japanese emigration, and a staging ground for war with the Soviet Union. In the February 26th Incident of 1936, about 1,500 troops went on a rampage of assassination against the current and former prime ministers. Other military units put down the revolt, but Japan's civilian leadership capitulated to the army's demands in the hope of ending domestic violence.⁷²

3. German and Japanese Coalition

In November 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact, an agreement to exchange information and cooperate with each other in preventing communist activities, was signed by Japan and Germany, to which Italians became a party a year later.⁷³ War was launched against China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937. Supposedly, an unexpected conflict took place near Beijing between Chinese and Japanese troops and quickly escalated into full-scale warfare. The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) ensued, and relations with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union deteriorated.⁷⁴

4. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

Under the prime ministership of Konoe Fumimaro⁷⁵ (1891-1945)—the last head of the famous Fujiwara house—the government was streamlined and given absolute power over the nation's assets.⁷⁶ In 1940, the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan, according to tradition, Konoe's cabinet called for the establishment of a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," a concept building on Konoe's 1938 call for a "New Order in Greater East Asia," encompassing Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast Asia.⁷⁷ The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was to integrate Asia politically and economically—under

⁷² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 703-711. Also see Iriye, 41-50.

⁷³ Iriye, 50-54 and Dolan and Worden, "Japan: A Country Study," On-line book.

⁷⁴ McClain, 401 and 442-447.

⁷⁵ Konoe was in office during the years 1937-1939 and 1940-1941.

⁷⁶ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 715-717. See also McClain, 451-455 and Duus, 222-227.

⁷⁷ Iriye, 131-143.

Japanese leadership—against Western domination and was developed in recognition of the changing geopolitical situation emerging in 1940. In 1942, the Greater East Asia Ministry was established, and in 1943, the Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo.⁷⁸

5. Tripartite Pact

Also in 1940, political parties were ordered to dissolve, and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, comprising members of all former parties, was established to transmit government orders throughout society. In September 1940, Japan joined the Axis alliance with Germany and Italy when it signed the Tripartite Pact, a military agreement to re-divide the world that was directed primarily against the United States.⁷⁹

6. Relations with the United States

There had been a long-standing and deep-seated antagonism between Japan and the United States since the first decade of the 20th century. Each perceived the other as a military threat. The Japanese greatly resented the racial discrimination perpetuated by United States immigration laws, and the Americans became increasingly wary of Japan's interference in the self-determination of other peoples. Japan's military expansionism and quest for national self-sufficiency eventually led the United States in 1940 to embargo war supplies, abrogate a long-standing commercial treaty, and put greater restrictions on the export of critical commodities. These American tactics, rather than forcing Japan to a standstill, made Japan more desperate. After signing the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact in April 1941, Japan participated in diplomatic negotiations with Washington aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement. Washington, concerned about Japan's role in the Tripartite Pact, demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Southeast Asia. Japan countered that it would not use force unless the United States attacked Germany or Italy. Further, Japan demanded that the United States and Britain not interfere with a Japanese

⁷⁸ Iriye, 131-143.

⁷⁹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 717-718. See also McClain 473-475.

settlement in China. Since certain Japanese military leaders were working at cross-purposes with officials seeking a peaceful settlement talks were deadlocked.⁸⁰

7. Pearl Harbor Attack

On October 15, 1941, Army Minister Tojo Hideki (1884-1948) declared the negotiations ended. Konoe resigned and was replaced by Tojo. After the final United States refusal of Japan's terms of negotiation, on 1 December 1941, the Imperial Conference ratified the decision to embark on a war of "self-defense and self-preservation" and to attack the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. After initial naval and battlefield successes and a tremendous overextension of its resources in the war against a quickly mobilizing United States and Allied war effort, Japan was unable to sustain a "Greater East Asia."⁸¹

8. Japanese Defeat

As early as 1943, Konoe led a peace movement, and Tojo was forced from office in July 1944.⁸² His successors sought a peace negotiation, but the United States offered only unconditional surrender. After the detonation of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 8, 1945, respectively, the emperor asked that the Japanese people bring peace to Japan by "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable" by surrendering to the Allied powers.⁸³ The official instrument of surrender was signed on board the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.⁸⁴ The terms of surrender included the occupation of Japan by Allied military forces, assurances that Japan would never again go to war, restriction of Japanese sovereignty to the four main islands "and such minor islands as may be determined," and surrender of Japan's colonial holdings.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ McClain, 476-481. See also Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 718-721 and 813-815.

⁸¹ Iriye, 181-185.

⁸² Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 824.

⁸³ Ibid, 816. Also see, McClain 515.

⁸⁴ Keylor, 245. Also see, McClain, 523.

⁸⁵ McClain, 524-528. Also see Duus, 244-250.

H. POSTWAR JAPAN

1. Occupation Years

After World War II had ended, Japan was devastated. The Pacific War left all the large cities with the exception of Kyoto, the industries, and the transportation networks severely damaged. A severe food shortage continued to affect the Japanese for several years.⁸⁶ A period of demilitarization and democratization followed in Japan between 1945 and 1947. Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), Japan's army and navy ministries were abolished, munitions and military equipment were destroyed, and war industries were transformed into civilian uses. War crimes trials found 4,200 Japanese officials guilty; 700 were executed, and 186,000 other public figures were purged. State Shinto was disestablished, and on 1 January 1946, Emperor Hirohito repudiated his divinity.⁸⁷

MacArthur pushed the government to amend the 1889 Meiji Constitution. On 3 May 1947, the new Japanese constitution came into force.⁸⁸ Constitutional reforms were accompanied by economic reforms, including agricultural land redistribution, reinstatement of trade unions, and severe proscriptions on *zaibatsu*. MacArthur intended to break up power concentrations by dissolving the *zaibatsu* and other large companies, and by decentralizing the education system and the police. In land reform, concentrations in land ownership were removed. Especially during the first half of the occupation, Japan's media was subject to a rigid censorship of any anti-American statements and controversial topics such as the race issue.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ McClain, 528-533.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 529-550. Also see, Duus, 259-268.

⁸⁸ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 820-821.

⁸⁹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 821-825. Also see "Japanese history: Postwar," in *Japan Guide* Homepage, available at <http://www.japan-guide.com/e/e2124.html>, accessed on 2 November 2005.

The relatively rapid stabilization of Japan led to a relaxation of SCAP purges and press censorship. Quick economic recovery was encouraged, restrictions on former *zaibatsu* members eventually were lifted, and foreign trade was allowed.⁹⁰ Finally, in September 1951, 51 nations met in San Francisco to reach a peace accord with Japan. China, India, and the Soviet Union participated in the conference but did not sign the treaty, formally known as the Treaty of Peace.⁹¹ Japan renounced its claims to Korea, Taiwan, Penghu, the Kuril Islands, southern Sakhalin, islands it had gained by League of Nations mandate, South China Sea islands, and Antarctic territory, while agreeing to settle disputes peacefully according to the United Nations Charter. Japan's rights to defend itself and to enter into collective security arrangements were acknowledged. The 1952 ratification of the Japan-United States Mutual Security Assistance Pact also ensured a strong defense for Japan and a large postwar role in Asia for the United States.⁹²

2. Occupation's Aftermath

With the peace treaty that went into effect in 1952, the occupation ended on 28 April 1952. Japan's Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, accompanied by large public demonstrations. Great public turbulence was also caused by the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960. After the Korean War, and accelerated by it, Japan's economy flourished. The economic growth resulted in a quick rise of the living standards, changes in society and the stabilization of the ruling position of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japan's relations with the Soviet Union were normalized in 1956, and the ones with China in 1972.

3. LDP Dominance and the Economic Miracle

Three years after Japan's independence, the fledgling predecessor of the LDP achieved a majority in the Diet of Japan, which would be unchallenged

⁹⁰ Duus, 272-273 and 278-282.

⁹¹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 826.

⁹² Duus, 274-278.

under the LDP until the 1990s. The LDP government, through institutions such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), encouraged Japanese industrial development overseas while imposing restrictions on foreign companies willing to do business within the country.⁹³ These practices, coupled with a dependence on the United States for defense, allowed Japan's economy to increase exponentially during the Cold War. The 1973 oil crisis shocked the Japanese economy, which heavily depended on oil. The reaction was a shift to high technology industries.⁹⁴ By 1980, many Japanese products, particularly automobiles and electronics, were being exported around the world, and Japan's industrial sector was the second largest in the world after the United States. This growth pattern continued unabatedly until the 1990s, when the Japanese economy finally collapsed.⁹⁵

From the 1950s to the 1980s, Japan's history consists mainly of its rapid development into a first-rank economic power, through a process often referred to as the "economic miracle." The post-war settlement transformed Japan into a constitutional party democracy, but it was ruled by a single party throughout the period of the "miracle."⁹⁶ This strength and stability allowed the government substantial freedom to manage economic development in the long term. Through extensive state investment and guidance, and with a kick-start provided by technology transfer from the United States and Europe, Japan quickly rebuilt its heavy industrial sector. Given a massive boost by the Korean War, in which it acted as a major supplier to the United Nations force, Japan's economy started an extended period of exceptionally rapid growth, led by the manufacturing sectors. Japan emerged as a significant power in many economic spheres, including steel working, car manufacturing, and the manufacture of electronic

⁹³ McClain, 565-571.

⁹⁴ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 828-860.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 562-565 and 571-586.

⁹⁶ Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 2-17.

goods.⁹⁷ Throughout this period, its annual GNP growth was over twice that of its nearest competitor, the United States. By the 1980s, Japan, despite its small size, had the world's second largest economy.⁹⁸ These developments had a marked effect on its relations with the United States, Japan's closest ally. The United States initially heavily encouraged Japan's development, seeing a strong Japan as a necessary counterbalance to Communist China.⁹⁹

4. Bitter Economic Relations with the United States

By the 1980s, the sheer strength of the Japanese economy had become a protruding point because the United States had a massive trade deficit with Japan; that is, it imported considerably more from Japan than it exported to it. This deficit became a scapegoat for American economic weakness, and relations between the two cooled substantially.¹⁰⁰ There was particular friction over the issue of Japanese automobile exports, as Japanese automobiles by this point accounted for over 30% of the American market.¹⁰¹ The U.S. also heavily criticized the closed nature of the Japanese economy, which was marked by heavy tariff protection. As a result, it was very difficult for foreign firms to enter into the Japanese market. Japan throughout the 1980s and 1990s maintained a process of economic liberalization aimed at appeasing American criticism. The automobile issue was dealt with through a series of "voluntary" restrictions on Japanese exports and by making factories in America.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ McClain, 591-598.

⁹⁸ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 860-867.

⁹⁹ Duus, 338-345.

¹⁰⁰ Duus, 345-347. See also McClain 601-603.

¹⁰¹ Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 869-875.

¹⁰² McClain 608-611.

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III. POSTWAR JAPANESE POLITICS AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA JAPAN

A. ASSESSMENT OF POSTWAR JAPANESE POLITICS

Japan has been in the center of regional politics in the Asia-Pacific region since the early 20th century, and it surfaced as the most dynamic economic center in Asia after the Second World War. Japan is not only a regional power; in fact, its economy has global significance and its geopolitical location rests in the heart of the American, Chinese, and Russian interests.¹⁰³ Yet, it remains unclear for Japan and the rest of the world what Japan's role is in the global context. Japan has been very quiet and inactive in world political affairs ever since the end of the Second World War. Many scholars attribute this lack of activity to the assumption of responsibility for Japanese security by the United States. The Japanese domestic politics that emerged after 1952 also played a significant role in Japanese anti-militarism and pacifism.¹⁰⁴

As Japan rapidly rose to be an economic giant in the postwar years, and with the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, more questions have become the subject of heated discussion regarding Japanese economic strength. Even though as of this writing there has been a lengthy period of Junichiro Koizumi's premiership in which there has been a steady and determined set of international policies, it is still not well known how Japan will define and defend its national security.

1. Occupation, Reform, and Recovery

After losing the Pacific War, Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces in 1945. The occupation, mainly conducted by the United States, continued until 1952. In 1952, the United States turned over the administration to the Japanese,

¹⁰³ Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, second and revised edition, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 186-203.

¹⁰⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, (Ithaca, New York: East Asia program, Cornell University, 1993), xi.

except in a few areas such as Okinawa, all of which were to be returned by 1972. Even though Japan was raised to an equal footing with the rest of the countries in the world, it still heavily depended on U.S support. Thus, ever since it was occupied, Japan has provided much economically yet little militarily for its own defense, and the United States has shouldered the military burden of Japan's external security.¹⁰⁵

During the occupation years, the United States managed the process of demilitarization and democratization of Japan. Major changes were made in political, social, and economic institutions and practices. During this seven-year occupation, Japan had literally no control over its foreign affairs and became, in effect, a ward of the United States on the international scene. It adopted a new constitution in 1947, Article 9 of which openly states the permanent renouncement of war and the threat or use of force by the Japanese people.¹⁰⁶

The United States provided Japanese defense and sustained a free trade order that let Japan practice its own commercial interests throughout the Cold War. Japan chose not to partake in collective security arrangements throughout this period and avoided international strategic affairs.¹⁰⁷ Japan followed the United States' lead in international affairs during the 1950s and the 1960s, although it refused to share some of the responsibilities. Japanese foreign policy became somewhat independent after 1971 when the Nixon administration failed to inform Japan in advance about Sino-American rapprochement; however, it did not change fundamentally, as it continued to be reactive and defensive in avoiding international conflicts.

¹⁰⁵ Although Japanese security was mostly provided by the U.S. military, Japan provided the economic aspects of it as part of its host nation support. Japanese host nation support accounts for more than 70 percent of the U.S. military expenditures in Japan according to the Japanese Bluebook 2004 published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/index.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Official Website of Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, *The Constitution of Japan*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed on 3 June 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Yahuda, 186-203.

2. Confrontation Politics, the Economic Miracle, and Japanese Conservatism

During the 1950s and 1960s, three basic principles directed Japan's foreign policy actions. First, Japan chose to cooperate closely with the United States for both security and economic reasons. Second, Japan supported the promotion of a free-trade system that was friendly to its own economic needs. Lastly, Japan favored international cooperation through the United Nations—to which it was admitted in 1956—and other multilateral bodies. As Japan adhered to these principles with increasing enthusiasm, it experienced a phenomenal economic recovery and growth during the first two decades after the end of the occupation.¹⁰⁸

Japanese people and politicians, despite the provision of basic protection to Japan by the United States, did not always embrace the American presence. For example, during the Johnson administration, relations with the Japanese circled largely around the war in Vietnam. This resulted in tremendous stress as the Japanese public was strongly opposed to the war and Johnson was unsatisfied with Japan's unwillingness to involve itself more vigorously in Asian security affairs. This tension was partially resolved at the 1967 Johnson-Sato summit when Prime Minister Sato Eisaku agreed to support the U.S. position in return for greater Japanese involvement in Okinawa.¹⁰⁹ The 1969 Nixon-Sato summit resulted in Japan's agreement to recognize its own interest in maintaining security in the region. The acknowledgment by Japan of its own security responsibilities, on the other hand, did not suffice for the Nixon administration. Nixon saw a greater need for Asian states to provide for their own defense. The "Nixon Doctrine,"¹¹⁰ as it came to be called, emphasized the

¹⁰⁸ Naoki Tanaka, "Toward a New Manufacturing Paradigm," *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/japan/opinion/tanaka.html, accessed on 5 June 2005.

¹⁰⁹ Rust M. Deming, "The Changing American Government Perspective on the Missions and Strategic Focus of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto eds., in *The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia*, (Stanford: Asia Pacific Research Center, 2004), 56.

¹¹⁰ Due to its location of proclamation in 1969, it was initially known as the "Guam Doctrine."

principle that while the United States would support maintaining a nation's security, it was that nation's chief responsibility to provide for its own security. Policies of the Nixon administration mainly aimed at reducing Japan's mercantilist approach to trade and bringing Japan closer to normalizing its status in the international community. Relations between Washington and Tokyo were not, however, always confrontational.

The basic principles of Japanese foreign policy did not change in the 1970s, but pressure at home and abroad led Japan to approach its foreign policy from a new perspective. Domestic pressures on the government to exercise more foreign policy initiatives independent of the United States gradually increased. The surprise United States opening to China and other regional issues required a more independent Japanese foreign policy.¹¹¹ The nation's exceptional economic growth had made it a foremost world economic power by the early 1970s and had created a sense of pride and self-esteem, particularly among the younger generation. The demand for a more independent foreign policy was a reflection of this enhanced self-image, yet at the same time, Japanese people continued to embrace pacifism wholeheartedly.

3. Social and Political Change

It is almost compelling for one to say that not only Japanese political culture¹¹² and strategic culture,¹¹³ but also Japanese culture in general became pacifist in nature. This characteristic of the Japanese people may easily be attributed to their deeply rooted *culture of respect*, which leads them to highly regard the decisions made on their behalf—even if they disagree with the

¹¹¹ Dolan and Worden, "Japan: A Country Study," On-line book.

¹¹² By political culture, I use Sydney Verba and Gabriel Almond's definition quoted in Jeffrey S. Lantis's "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," published in *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall 2002), 90. The definition simply states that political culture is a society's collection of beliefs and values that help them relate to a political system.

¹¹³ By strategic culture, I use Alastair Ian Johnston's definition in his influential work "Thinking About Strategic Culture," published in *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), 47. He defines strategic culture as the formation of a setting or environment of imprecise thought processes, which limits behavioral choices, and it can play a role in establishing long lasting preferences in interstate political affairs in his influential work.

decision—by the ruling elite as exemplified throughout their history.¹¹⁴ Thus, these attributes, combined with the restrictive 1947 Constitution, caused Japan to refrain from creating a large military, developing a military doctrine, and building a military industrial complex. As the United States continued to provide defense for Japan throughout the most hectic years of the Cold War, a specific culture in Japan started to take shape. The horrors of the Second World War, the economic problems experienced thereafter, loss of freedom in the immediate aftermath of the war, and Japanese geopolitical isolation for centuries contributed to the development of a specific culture, with a pacifist nature, that prevents Japan from becoming belligerent, pursuing aggressive foreign policies, and building a sufficiently strong military to defend itself.¹¹⁵ As a result, many scholars, Japanese and foreign, have posited different views on Japanese sovereignty.

4. Japan and the Notion of Sovereignty

States in the international system have varying degrees of autonomous power. Supreme authority, or sovereignty, of particular states can vary dramatically over time, and some scholars and statesmen today reject the

¹¹⁴ Duus, 6.

¹¹⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, Nobuo Okawara, Thomas U. Berger, and Yuri Kase, as well as a few other authors made significant contributions to the studies on Japanese strategic culture. In their arguments, they claim that the Japanese strategic culture has irrevocably changed from militarism to pacifism. Refer to Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*, Thomas U. Berger, *Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan*, Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*, Yuri Kase, "Japan," in *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* eds. John Glenn, Darryl Howlett, and Stuart Poore, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), and Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," in *International Security*.

Westphalian notion of sovereignty—sovereignty of nation-states.¹¹⁶ However, sovereignty, in dictionary terms, is the exclusive right to exercise supreme authority over a geographic region, group of people, or oneself. Sovereignty over a nation is generally vested in a government or other political agency, although there are cases where it is held by an individual. This notion of sovereignty brings forth the concept of normalcy; that is, defining what constitutes a normal country. As stated earlier, this study concentrates on the normalcy of Japan. Normal statehood was denied to Japan in the period between 1945 and 1952 as these were occupation years.¹¹⁷ Japan never fully returned to normalcy after the occupation because it never organized itself as a sovereign entity that could ultimately defend itself. Although a free democracy, Japan is not completely normal in the sense that it does not have the power to defend itself from external threats, it avoids collective security initiatives, and it depends mostly on the United States security umbrella for its defense. The current debate in Japan on making changes to its 1947 Constitution and building a strong enough military to not only defend itself, but also contribute to international peace operations overseas, and thus assist the United States, has become an important issue in Japanese politics.

B. JAPANESE SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Japan's security role in both regional and international affairs has experienced a marked shift from that which it used to play during the Cold War. Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War rested on two pillars: first, Japan

¹¹⁶ In his speech delivered as the then-Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana stated that “humanity and democracy [were] two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order” and added that “the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration.” This speech is available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981112a.htm>, accessed on 13 September 2005. Also, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer referred to Westphalian order and stated that the international system based on this order was obsolete. His speech is available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/eu_politik/ausgabe_archiv?suche=1&archiv_id=1027&bereich_id=4&type_id=3 and at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/infoservice/download/pdf/reden/redene/r000512b-r1008e.pdf>, accessed on 13 September 2005.

¹¹⁷ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, (NY: New Press, 1999), 197.

pursued economic diplomacy while avoiding any political role in international security affairs; and second, Japan entrusted its stake in regional security to the United States. In the early 1980s, when the Soviet-American military competition was intensifying, Japan took salient steps to strengthen its defense policy and security alliance with the United States. Although sufficient for the Cold War threat, these steps in strengthening the Japanese military did not qualify as being satisfactory for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. Domestic politics coupled with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prevented Japan from providing the necessary support for the United States. After this point, Japanese passivity towards security affairs came under scrutiny at the onset of the post-Cold War era.¹¹⁸

In the post-Cold War environment, Japan, still reluctant to partake in international security challenges, continues to pursue a comprehensive security strategy integrating its security and economic interests. Japan has readjusted its strategy in four ways. It has expanded its defense cooperation with the United States, it asserts itself more confidently in defending its own territory, it provides non-combat support in the global war on terrorism, and it substantially supports East Asian economic integration and cooperation. Koizumi's much-criticized support for the war on terrorism and stronger alliance with the United States created greater room for Japan to maneuver autonomously in pursuing its foreign policy in Asia and beyond.¹¹⁹

1. Renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

After the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the 1995-96 Chinese missile tests near Taiwan, Japanese measures of restricting themselves from military strengthening received caustic criticism. Since then, the steps Japan has

¹¹⁸ Bhubhindar Singh, "Japan's post-Cold War security policy: bringing back the normal state," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, April 2002.

¹¹⁹ Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy," in *Strategic Asia 2004-05*, edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington and Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 103.

taken indicate preparation for normalization.¹²⁰ Prime Minister Ryutaru Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton signed a Joint Declaration on Security on 17 April 1996, which was a revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The agreement declared that the U.S.-Japan security treaty of 1960 “remains the cornerstone” of their policies, that their combined forces in Japan would engage in policy coordination for dealing with regional crises, and on a reciprocal basis provide equipment and supplies.¹²¹ The U.S.-Japan security treaty justifies the Self-Defense Forces and, from this point of view, the treaty stands above the constitution, which is supposed to act as the highest law of the land. The security treaty is the guarantor of authority and order. According to Mary Jordan, almost all discussion stops when the treaty is invoked, and nothing else in Japan comes close to having this kind of authority and effect.¹²² The Japanese even made a commitment to move forward for closer relations with the United States, and in May 1999, the Japanese Parliament approved legislation that further expanded the country’s military partnership with the United States.¹²³

2. Post-September 11 Trends

The evolution of Japanese foreign policy after the September 11 terrorist attacks does not indicate a significant departure from its traditional comprehensive economic and security strategy, but it does make it apparent that Japan has recalibrated its policy by expanding its international security role and promoting East Asian integration. Although he appeared more assertive than his predecessors, Koizumi so far chose to remain within the bounds of the constitutional constraints regarding security policy, which has been reassuring to

¹²⁰ Mochizuki, 106.

¹²¹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinaka, “Bullying, Buying, and Binding: U.S.-Japanese Transnational Relations and Domestic Structures,” in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 80.

¹²² Mary Jordan, “Japan Approves Expanded Military Alliance with U.S.” in *Washington Post*, 25 May 1999, A10.

¹²³ Jordan, A10.

Japan's Asian neighbors.¹²⁴ However, certain moves toward regional integration by Japan have come into sight recently. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces formally participated in a multilateral military exercise; the biggest war games in Asia called the Cobra Drills, on 2 May 2005 in waters off Thailand for the first time since the Second World War.¹²⁵

3. Constitutional Revision

There is in Japan a growing mood in favor of constitutional revision. The Diet's long-time constitutional guardian, the opposition Socialist Party, collapsed with the end of the Cold War, and many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have begun to take seriously the party platform for constitutional revision that had long been nominal. Therefore, in 2000, the Diet established committees to review the constitution. Those who want a revision are calling for a new constitution in five to ten years.

4. Post-Cold War Japanese Foreign Policy Evolution

In the post-Cold War period, as interdependence has become deeper in all fields, ensuring world peace and prosperity became indispensable for the peace and prosperity of Japan itself. Japan, with its economic strength exceeded only by the European Union (EU) as a whole and the United States, became a tremendously influential country not simply on economic affairs but on all major issues of importance to the international community, including political and global-scale issues. Japanese foreign policy starting in the early 1990s indicated that Japan aimed to lead active and creative diplomacy in cooperation with other major countries by setting forth a direction to be taken toward the creation of a new international framework. Japan's role as an Asian industrialized democratic country became increasingly important.¹²⁶ Japanese cooperation in the Gulf Crisis and in Cambodia brought about a change in the

¹²⁴ Mochizuki, 127.

¹²⁵ "Pacifist Japan to Join Asia's Largest Annual War Games," *DefenseNews.com*, On-line article, available at <http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20050421364480.html>, 19 April 2005.

¹²⁶ "Diplomatic Bluebook 2003," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/index.html>, accessed on 6 June 2005.

perception of pacifism; that is to say, support was gradually spreading for a pacifist notion which consisted of contributing more actively to ensure the peace and prosperity of the entire world, and going beyond the simple pacifism of not becoming a military power and not invading other countries.¹²⁷ Japan's annual foreign policy statement in 1994 stated:

In today's international community, as clearly epitomized in the response to the Gulf Crisis, any single country, even the United States, can neither settle international problems nor ensure the peace and prosperity of the international community. Moreover, any task that the international community is faced with, whether it is the recovery of sustainable growth of the world economy, global-scale problems such as the environment, or the strengthening of the regimes of non-proliferation, cannot be tackled without multilateral cooperation. On the other hand, a single major country can impede solution of the problems by refusing to cooperate in an international effort. It has therefore, become increasingly important to ensure multilateral coordination led by major countries, in order to sustain and promote peace and prosperity.¹²⁸

The continued growth of Japan's foreign aid appears to be motivated by two fundamental factors. First, Japanese policy is aimed at assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its position as a global economic power. Second, many believed, the growing Japanese foreign aid program comes largely in response to pressures from the United States and other allies for Japan to take on a greater share of the financial burdens in support of shared security, political, and economic interests. In 2005, Japan began a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.¹²⁹

In the end, Japanese foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War world focused on three major areas. In the political realm, Japan strived to ensure its

¹²⁷ "Diplomatic Bluebook 1995," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1995/index.html>, accessed on 6 June 2005.

¹²⁸ "Diplomatic Bluebook 1994," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1994/index.html> accessed on 6 June 2005.

¹²⁹ "Japan," *The World Factbook*, CIA, available at <http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html>, accessed on 4 June 2005.

own security through its alliance with the United States, increasing its defense capabilities, and promotion of diplomatic efforts to ensure international peace and security. Japan also adopted a comprehensive approach that dealt with regional conflicts and promotion of arms control and disarmament and strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime. Japan, in the international economic realm, aimed at ensuring sustainable growth of the world economy and undertook a role to provide support for developing countries and countries in transition. Along with the multilateral cooperation mentioned above, moves toward regional cooperation became increasingly active both in political and economic fields. In the regional realm, moves for Asia-Pacific regional cooperation steadily progressed, and in particular, against the background of spectacular economic development in the region, much attention was paid to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization. Moreover, while regional cooperation in this area has so far been mainly a vertical one formed through increased bilateral economic cooperation and direct investments, there has also been progress recently in horizontal cooperative relations, such as the Japan-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries' initiative toward the development of Indochina. In the political arena, the creation of the "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)" was agreed upon in July 1993 as a forum for multilateral consultations on the security issues of the Asia-Pacific region, and the inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994.¹³⁰

It was in this context that Japan signaled its intention to seek permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. The Japanese felt that as the second largest economy in the world and the leading supplier of the development assistance combined with the substantial amounts of funds provided to the United Nations, Japan not only had the credentials, but also deserved to be a permanent member of the Security Council. It was also in this context that Japan went forward in revitalizing its security alliance with the United

¹³⁰"About Us," *The ASEAN Regional Forum Official Website*, available at <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/Default.aspx?tabid=49>, accessed on 11 October 2005.

States in 1996, legalizing active logistical support for American troops conducting military operations in the region. After September 11, the boundaries of the support were widened to include the Indian Ocean, and moreover, Japan sent 950 military personnel to Iraq to participate in non-combat roles.¹³¹ As these events were occurring and the developments and intricacies of the post-Cold War era were unraveling, Japan was faced with different options for strengthening its military and revising its constitution along the path to becoming a normal country.

C. WHITHER JAPAN?

Facing a series of dilemmas, Japan moves along in the 21st century. Is it possible for Japan to continue to grow as a world economic leader without assuming a greater political role? In that context, is it rational for Japan to be considered a political leader when it cannot even provide for the security of its own territory without foreign assistance? Those countries trading with Japan complain that it enjoys an unfair advantage, but when Japanese firms invest in their economies, they raise the issue of Japanese domination. After each international crisis, Western powers call on Japan to "contribute its fair share" to the peacekeeping forces. At the same time, a significant number of the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors demand that there be no extension of Japanese military power beyond its borders so that the terrible events of the Second World War do not repeat.

¹³¹ "Diplomatic Bluebook 2004," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blubook/2004, 18, accessed on 7 September 2005.

IV. JAPANESE NORMALIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War directly affected and partially altered Japanese politics and Japan's international environment. Despite that, Japan continues to restrict itself from shouldering the role of a truly independent country. To a great extent, it has persisted in viewing itself as a pacifist country, a consensus which is bolstered by its peace constitution.¹³² Even though with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main threat around which the U.S.-Japan alliance was formed during the gloomy years of the Cold War disappeared, the security alliance with the United States has continued to be the foundation of Japanese foreign and national security policies. Nevertheless, Japan started to modify its approaches and initiatives within the confines of the alliance in such a fashion that suggested that the country, although slowly and cautiously, was establishing a new international role for itself. This development period stimulated a heated debate in Japan.

It was during this episode that three different viewpoints surfaced in Japanese political and academic circles. The then-Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General, Ichiro Ozawa, initially voiced one view, which is essentially a nationalist view. He proposed that Japan should become a "normal country"; that is, that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces should be able to fight alongside their allies in a multilateral force and participate in peace operations around the world. A second view that surfaced during this time among liberals was the idea of establishing a Japanese constitutional basis for contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations. A third view, held among those who have been advocating a pacifist Japanese culture and national security strategy, posits that a revival of militarist Japanese politics and society is still possible, and that any constitutional reform must be postponed until the deeply entrenched martial

¹³² Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, second and revised edition, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 314.

values utterly vanish. Roughly fifteen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and Japan has yet to make a determined move towards the aforementioned nationalist, liberal, and leftist approaches, respectively.

The purpose of this study is to analyze Japanese normalization in the context of strengthening its military and assess Japan's options for normalizing. Should Japan become a "normal country?"¹³³ And if yes, why? This study will argue that Japan should become a normal country because it would benefit Japanese interests in a threefold way:

- First, it would advance Japan's regional leadership and would increase Japan's global significance,
- Second, it would increase the likelihood of Japan's accession to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, which then would increase Japanese influence on world affairs,
- Third, it would improve Japan's economy in both the short and the long run.¹³⁴

This study will show the abovementioned argument by first giving a brief background on how Japan came to this point, then by describing what normalization entails and what the term "normal country" means, and finally by reviewing Japanese foreign and national security policies in the post-Cold War period. The study will then lay out Japan's options and will assess each option in terms of Japanese national interests. Following that, this study will evaluate which option better suits Japanese interests, which will then be followed by a section describing how such normalization can be implemented. The study concludes with a summary of findings and some tentative conclusions.

¹³³ The "Normal Country" debate about Japan has been discussed ever since the end of the Cold War. Ichiro Ozawa was one of the first politicians to voice it outspokenly. However, there have been a number of different prescriptions for Japanese normalization. Thus, when the expression "normal country" is used in this study, it has a rather general meaning that encompasses all of the potential prescriptions, not just Ichiro Ozawa's approach.

¹³⁴ This claim assumes that Japan would profit from military exports; however, this is a highly debated claim among political economists. Some political economists argue that military exports may have a negative growth effect. In this study, Japan's military exports are considered to be competitive with other Western countries. This would lead Japan to easily obtain a market share of arms exports. Besides, as Japan strengthens its military, the military industrial complex will sell arms to the Japanese SDF, which will cause the Japanese economy to remain dynamic.

B. NORMAL COUNTRY AND THE CURRENT DEBATE ON JAPANESE NORMALCY

Japanese foreign policy has often been described as anomalous, if not aberrant or abnormal, in terms of 'normal' industrial powers.¹³⁵ After the Second World War, Japan was reincorporated into the advanced industrial world as a "semisovereign" power; an aspect of which is, it accepted unprecedented constitutional constraints in its military capacity and independence.¹³⁶ Thus, it became unusually dependent per se on the array of U.S.-led regional and multilateral economic and security institutions. These institutions provide Japan with a political bulwark of stability that far transcends the institutions' more immediate and practical purposes.¹³⁷ The security relationship between the United States and Japan is best depicted by "binding," with the United States doing most of the "advising" and Japan most of the "accepting." Since the mid-1970s, the defense cooperation has increased smoothly and apparently to the satisfaction of both governments.¹³⁸

The problems surrounding Japan's search for a normal role stem from the fact that Japan is not a normal country; it is a huge economic power yet a political pygmy—a distortion that occurred as a result of the strategy pursued by the United States during the Cold War.¹³⁹ First coined and popularized by Japanese political leader Ozawa Ichiro due to the inadequate Japanese response to the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990-1991, normalization has been the shorthand to characterize the recent trends in Japanese security policy. Ozawa urged his country to discard its erroneous and imprudent "one-country pacifism," and

¹³⁵ The Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation, "Is Japan a 'Normal' Power? Japanese Leadership and Asian Regional Organizations," On-line, available at <http://www.daiwa-foundation.org.uk>, 30 August 2005.

¹³⁶ The term "semisovereign" was first introduced by Peter J. Katzenstein in his book *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).

¹³⁷ G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 249-250.

¹³⁸ Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, 80.

¹³⁹ Chalmers Johnson, "Japan in Search of a 'Normal' Role," *IGCC Policy paper* 3, July 1992.

become simply a “normal” country, which was capable of defending itself from external threats without heavily relying on another country—namely the United States. This suggestion, however, was never intended to imply reverting to pre-1945 militarism.¹⁴⁰ The Japanese constitutional constraints established during the occupation years mean that Japan has not possessed normal statehood for more than half a century.¹⁴¹ This, then, leads one to ask what constitutes a normal state.

In short, a state can be described as an organized political community controlling a definite territory, having organized, functional governmental institutions, and possessing internal and external sovereignty.¹⁴² Attributed to Max Weber in general, monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a country has been traditionally a salient feature of a state from the domestic point of view.¹⁴³ Although used interchangeably, the terms country, nation, state and land can also be distinguished. Whereas country is the geographical area, nation designates a group of people. State refers to a governmental body and an entity in international law, and land refers to a country and its people. According to the Montevideo Convention signed in 1933, the definition of state is as follows:

¹⁴⁰ Mochizuki, 105.

¹⁴¹ Takashi Inoguchi, “Japans Ambition for Normal Statehood,” in Jorge I. Dominguez and Byung-kook Kim, eds., *Between Compliance And Conflict: East Asia, Latin America And The “New” Pax Americana*, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 2.

¹⁴² Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), 9.

¹⁴³ Max Weber, *Politics as Vocation*. Full text of the article is available at http://socialpolicy.ucc.ie/Weber_Politics_as_Vocation.htm. Max Weber was a German political economist and sociologist. He gave a speech in 1918, which then became *Politics as Vocation*. The following is given as documentation on the web page: ‘Politik als Beruf,’ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Muenchen, 1921), 396-450. Originally, a speech at Munich University, 1918, published in 1919 by Duncker & Humblodt, Munich. From H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.¹⁴⁴

With the aforementioned features and definitions, whether Japan completely qualifies for a normal state could be ascertained.

As noted earlier, after the Second World War, which ended with the unconditional surrender of the Japanese Empire, the United States occupied Japan for approximately seven years. Although the occupation ended in 1952, it was not until 1972 that Japan took control of all of its current territory.¹⁴⁵ However, the defense of Japan was never completely turned over to the Japanese military (Self-Defense Forces). The United States continues to have bases in Japan as it does in many of its allied countries. Japan's national defense policy has been based on maintaining the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, under which Japan assumed unilateral responsibility for its own internal security. Similar to the NATO agreement, the United States agreed to join in Japan's defense in the event that Japan or its territories were attacked, except that unlike the multilateral NATO agreement, this was a bilateral agreement. Although the size and the capability of the Self-Defense Forces have always limited its role, until 1976, defense planning focused on developing forces adequate to deal with potential regional adversaries' conventional capabilities. In 1976, the Japanese government decided upon a policy that the Self-Defense Forces would be developed only to repel a small-scale, limited invasion,¹⁴⁶ and that the Japanese nation would

¹⁴⁴ "The Avalon Project at Yale Law School," *Convention on Rights and Duties of States* December 26, 1933, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm>, accessed on 14 September 2005.

¹⁴⁵ The United States agreed to return Okinawa in 1971, and it was officially returned to Japanese control in 1972, which marked the final date of occupation of Japanese territories by the United States.

¹⁴⁶ Although this may be the case in many small West European countries, given Japan's size, population, economy, and history, this approach to defense policy becomes very abnormal, if not irrational.

depend on the United States to come to its aid in the event of a more serious incursion.¹⁴⁷ The Japanese Basic Policy for Defense is described as:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression.... To achieve this objective, the government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles: ... (4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.¹⁴⁸

On the other hand, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are strictly limited constitutionally. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution forever renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. It states that:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. ¹⁴⁹

The exact limitations of Article 9 constitute a controversial issue in Japan, but the Japanese government has interpreted it as allowing for Self-Defense Forces. In spite of such an interpretation, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have a limited overseas potential. In addition, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces lack long range offensive capabilities and air-refueling and do not have marines or amphibious units, special forces, a large cache of ammunition, or rules of engagement.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ "Japan Defense Agency (Bôeichô) and Japan Self-Defense Forces," *GlobalSecurity.Org*, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm>, accessed on 4 June 2005.

¹⁴⁸ "Basic Policy for Defense," *Japanese Self Defense Agency Homepage*, available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm, accessed on 4 June 2005.

¹⁴⁹ "The Constitution of Japan," *Official Website of Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed on 3 June 2005.

¹⁵⁰ Dolan and Worden, "Japan: A Country Study," On-line book.

Even though Article 9 has greatly influenced foreign policy over the years, the Japanese government reinterpreted the “renouncing clause” as the use of force in international affairs, not renouncement of a national right to self-defense. This interpretation allowed for the creation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. In practice, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are very well equipped, and the Maritime Self-Defense Forces are widely considered to be stronger than the navies of Japan's neighbors. In fact, with almost 240,000 military personnel and an annual budget of \$50 billion, Japan's Self-Defense Forces exceed that of British military in total spending and manpower. Its navy, in particular, scores high among experts for its capability.¹⁵¹

Since the early 1990s, Article 9 has been the central feature of a dispute over the ability of Japan to undertake multilateral military commitments overseas. By 1990, Japan's total defense expenditures were ranked third behind the then-Soviet Union and the United States, and today it ranks second.¹⁵² The United States urged Japan to assume a larger share of the burden of defense of the western Pacific. These conditions caused Article 9 to become increasingly irrelevant to Japan's security situation. However, Article 9 still acts as a serious hindrance against the growth of Japan's military capabilities. Despite the fading of bitter wartime memories, according to opinion polls, a certain portion of the general public continued to show strong support for this constitutional provision.¹⁵³

The majority of Japanese citizens approves of the spirit of Article 9, and considers it personally important; however, since the 1980s, there has been a shift away from a stance that would tolerate no alteration of the article to allow a

¹⁵¹ “Japan Defense Agency (Bōeichō) and Japan Self-Defense Forces,” *GlobalSecurity.Org*, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm>, accessed on 4 June 2005.

¹⁵² “Japan,” *The World Factbook*, CIA, available at <http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html>, accessed on 4 June 2005.

¹⁵³ “Constitution experts oppose revision of Article 9,” available at <http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2383/kempo.html>, accessed on 4 June 2005. Also, see *The Japan Times*, “Article 9 change signals desire to wage war,” available at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040813f2.htm>, accessed on 4 June 2005.

revision that would resolve the discord between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and Article 9. Even though some scholars claim that Japanese citizens oppose revision of the constitution, recent opinion polls indicated that a majority of Japanese citizens are actually in favor of revision, yet modification of Article 9 in particular still remains an uncertain issue.¹⁵⁴

The debate, in simple terms, could be summarized as a debate over Japanese normalcy. When viewed under the lens of the definition of a state, Japan lacks external sovereignty and complete monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its external affairs since Japanese defense decisions are dependent on United States defense policies. The current cabinet led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had hoped for a constitutional change by December 2005.¹⁵⁵

C. JAPANESE POLICY OPTIONS ASSESSED

Although some Japan scholars have in the past contemplated how Japan should normalize and why, the body of literature proposing solutions to Japan in regard to becoming a normal country remains limited. In this section, assessment of some of the possible options will be presented. The assessment will first explain what the options are, then posit the advantages of the various options followed by the disadvantages in political and economic terms.

What are the main options that Japan could choose to follow? There lie two possibilities ahead of Japan: “keep the status quo and do not normalize” or “normalize.” This question, as a natural reaction, must be followed by the question, that if Japan were to normalize, then how far this normalization should

¹⁵⁴ Osamu Nishi, “Constitutional Revision: Present Situation and Future Challenges,” *Foreign Press Center, Japan*, available at http://www.fpcj.jp/e/mres/briefingreport/bfr_197.html, accessed on 4 June 2005. Also, another opinion poll’s results available at <http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/?feed=TopNews&article=UPI-1-20050408-00304800-bc-japan-constitution.xml>, accessed on 4 June 2005, reveal that at least 61 percent of the Japanese citizens favor constitutional revision. United Press International reported that this poll was conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper on 12 and 13 March 2005 at 250 different locations in Japan, and the questions were directed at 3,000 eligible voters, 1,795 of which provided valid responses.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. Also see, “Stop the Prime Minister’s Attacks on Constitutional Principles,” in *Japan Press Weekly*, On-line, available at <http://www.japan-press.co.jp/2348/aug27.html>, accessed on 27 October 2005.

go. There stand four options ahead of Japan in that sense. First, Japan may choose to normalize by increasing the strength of the Self-Defense Forces to provide only for the defense of Japan. Second, Japan could strengthen its military and make the necessary changes to its constitutional system to not only defend itself from foreign and domestic threats, but also help the United States in security matters around the world. The third option for Japan is to become normal to the extent that it would fully eliminate its dependence on the United States and become a regional power ensuring not only its own security but its neighbors' security as well. The fourth option for Japan, although it sounds utopian, is to become a fully independent global power striving to ensure peace and stability around the world, which could also be depicted as a brand of "Japanese Wilsonianism."¹⁵⁶

1. Status Quo

Keeping the status quo seems appealing to many Japanese for quintessentially, change implies spending time and effort to realize the expected outcomes. As a result of our inert nature, we are unwilling to spend time and energy unless we most definitely have to. Keeping the status quo benefits Japan from only this perspective. That is, Japan will not permit extra military spending and will not receive antagonistic reactions from its neighbors, two of which can turn out to be extremely dangerous for Japan. Many Asian countries, including

¹⁵⁶ The term "Wilsonianism" refers to legalistic internationalism, a vision of international order that is based on peace, democracy, and free trade. The underlying principles were put forward in a fourteen-point program at the end of the First World War in 1918 by President Woodrow Wilson. The text of these fourteen points can be found at "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points," *The Avalon Project at Yale Law School*, available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm>. Many books and articles were published about Wilsonianism. For a larger definition, refer to Tamás Magyarics, *Wilsonianism: A Blueprint for 20th Century American Foreign Policy*, available at <http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/wilsonianism.html> or David Steigerwald, *Wilsonian Idealism in America*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994).

China and the two Koreas, have bad memories of their past relations with the Japanese, and they are unwilling to see a normal Japan.¹⁵⁷

On the other hand, the Japanese economy has gone into a serious recession, from which it has not yet fully recovered. In fact, the Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, in an effort to privatize the postal service and rescue the country from the economic downturn it has been experiencing, failed to get reforms enacted by the Diet. Finally, he called for an election in September 2005 hoping to achieve success. The election results were a landslide victory for the Koizumi government¹⁵⁸ since the Liberal Democratic Party won 296 seats in the 480-seat House of Representatives, 84 more than it had going into the race.¹⁵⁹ The results of the election clearly indicate the desire of the Japanese voters for economic reforms as they expect the Prime Minister's economic policies to help the country recover from its recession. As a result of the aforementioned economic problems, Japan had to cut down its defense spending. In fact, Japan's defense spending was so confined by budgetary constraints that the defense budget for the year 2003 went down by 0.3 percent, a decrease of approximately 4 billion dollars.¹⁶⁰ Thus, if Japan does not normalize and

¹⁵⁷ Shiping Tang, "Waiting for a 'Normal' Japan," in *Asia Times Online*, 7 January 2004, available at www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FA07Dh02.html, accessed on 30 August 2005. Also see Kin-ming Liu "In East Asia, there is more than one way to rise," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 September 2005, and see Brad Glosserman, "Becoming 'Normal' in Exceptional Times," PacNet Number 4A, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25 January 2002, available at <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0204A.pdf>. For a larger discussion of China's reaction to Japan's normalcy, see Yoichi Funabachi, *Alliance Adrift*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 76-93, 351-366, 420-445. For prospects of U.S.-Japan Alliance and Chinese views on it, see James Przystup "China, Japan, and the United States," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin eds., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 21-41. For China's role in the post-Cold War era in relation to Japan, see Michael Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific*, second and revised edition, (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 281-313.

¹⁵⁸ "Koizumi Secures Landslide Victory," *BBC News*, 12 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4232988.stm>, accessed on 11 October 2005.

¹⁵⁹ "Victorious Koizumi firm on fall '06 exit," *The Japan Times Online*, 13 September 2005, available at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20050913a1.htm>, accessed on 11 October 2005.

¹⁶⁰ Charles E. Morrison ed., *Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2004*, (Tokyo and New York: ASEAN ISIS, East West Center, and JCIE, 2004), 114.

strengthen its military accordingly, it will not have to spend any more than what it is currently spending. However, it may turn out to be disadvantageous if scrutinized more carefully.

First of all, if Japan keeps the status quo, it will not build a military industrial complex, from which it can benefit greatly. This is because Japan is not an arms exporter and its military industrial infrastructure receives only a very small share of the total arms production revenue in the world. It is no surprise to the world that the Japanese people have some of the most technologically advanced know-how and can emerge as a massive military equipment exporter that can challenge almost all of the countries making money from their military sales. A second disadvantage springs from the potential problems that may arise in the future. Japan is not ready to be abandoned by the United States, yet if the United States decides that it cannot commit an adequate force structure to provide for future Japanese defense, then Japan will come under serious danger as North Korea is openly, and China is covertly, hostile towards Japan. In addition, Japan has received harsh criticism from the West and, in particular, from some Americans for not supporting the United States in its efforts to keep the world safe and stable. Japan attempted to address the problem by committing a few troops to non-combat zones in Iraq, but when Japan's economic might is considered, 950 troops dispatched to non-combat zones in Iraq is unreasonably disproportionate. Without the necessary military might and without ridding Japan of its regional insecurities by fully being incorporated into the international system as a participatory country not just economically but also militarily, Japan's chances of continuing its regional leadership with global significance and being accepted into the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member in order to have global influence on world affairs remain slim.

2. Normalization

Japan's second alternative is to opt for normalization. As stated earlier, this has been the trend in Japanese politics, and the issue of normalization has become a question of how far to normalize rather than whether to normalize.

The first question that arises is the danger that this might pose to the world in general; however, suspicion of Japanese motives are almost completely unfounded. Although Japan has been seeking a greater role in international institutions, most notably in the United Nations Security Council, it has resisted a more dramatic redefinition of its security role within the wider Western order, which is a clear indication that the status of Japan in the Western security system is stable and that Japan is not pursuing great-power ambitions and capabilities.¹⁶¹ According to Samuel Huntington, Japanese political culture has significantly changed after 1945 and became liberal and antimilitaristic.¹⁶² In this sense, Japanese normalization does not pose any significant threat to the region or to the world at large.

a. First Normalization Option

Once determined to strengthen its military to don the mask of normalcy, Japan can choose one out of four options, the first of which is to become a state fully capable of defending itself but unwilling to partake in peace operations around the world and unenthusiastic about contributing to world peace and stability. This option would not only worsen the current aberrant nature of Japanese foreign policy, but would also antagonize its neighbors and strong members of the international community, which in turn could become very unsafe and destructive for Japan. China and the two Koreas challenge Japan because of their past experiences, and North Korea and China pose significant military threats as they both see Japan as a regional hegemon that has the potential to turn into a destructive military machine best exemplified by Japan's behavior prior to 1945.¹⁶³ Strategically, this option may transcend the status quo option in its potentially damaging nature.

¹⁶¹ Ikenberry, 250.

¹⁶² Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 244. The authors review Huntington's argument in their book.

¹⁶³ William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 484-492.

Economically, Japan would not benefit from assuming full responsibility for its own defense. First of all, by taking on full responsibility for its own defense, it will end up spending much of its accumulated capital on strengthening its military to confront any potential military attack. Secondly, as a result of becoming an aggressor state, it will not find a profitable market for its arms sales, and thus will not enjoy the benefits of building a military industrial complex. Lastly, in such a case, Japan will feel obligated to become a nuclear state since all of its immediate neighbors except South Korea possess nuclear weapons. Without the support of the United States, this could not only turn out to be extremely costly, but may lead Japan into an arms race with its neighboring countries—mainly China and North Korea, but not Russia. Such an arms race with China and North Korea has the potential of fatally damaging the already-stricken Japanese economy as it similarly devastated the Soviet Union economically and left it in pieces at the end of the Cold War. Besides, a Japan that takes sole responsibility for its own defense will lead to a more antagonistic China and Russia, who in the current state of affairs, adamantly refuse Japanese accession to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member. Since developing into a “normal” country concentrating on its own defense appears not to be advantageous, Japan should consider other forms of normal statehood.

b. Second Normalization Option

As mentioned earlier, Japan can choose to build up its military and reform its constitutional system to not only defend itself from external and internal threats, but also help the United States and its coalition partners in security matters around the world. By doing so, Japan will have more advantages and will reinforce its ties not only with the developed countries of the West, but also with other less developed and developing countries around the world. Although this option may have some disadvantages, it will have positive economic and political impacts on Japan.

Japanese post-Cold War political goals, particularly following the strong leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, have moved towards a more influential role in world affairs. This not only benefited Japan, but also was welcomed by the United States and its coalition partners. The Bush administration has always been determined to work closely with its key Asian ally just as the previous Clinton administration had.¹⁶⁴ It would be unjust to review the recent U.S.-Japan relations without mentioning Richard Armitage's name. He had a profound influence on the U.S. policy towards Asia and was the leader in formulating the administration's approach to Asia in general, and Japan in particular.¹⁶⁵ The Armitage-Nye report published in 2000 strongly supported a "normal" Japan with a strong alliance with the United States. The then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage stated that Japan could count on the United States, and the United States could count on Japan as well, and added that he believed the Japanese should remove all obstacles preventing them from participating in collective self-defense.¹⁶⁶ The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance ensured Japan's security in the region. The United States made its expectation very clear to Japanese politicians about Japan's active role in military affairs. For a healthy and robust security alliance, Japan must move forward with normalization.

On the other hand, as the Cold War threat diminished completely, the world moved away from its bipolar nature, and multilateral security arrangements became more important and necessary, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As the United States took upon the task of building a democratic state in Iraq and made the global war on terrorism its number one priority, a massive multilateral cooperation campaign against

¹⁶⁴ Robert G. Sutter, "United States: Leadership Maintained amid Continuing Challenges," in *Strategic Asia 2004-05* edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington and Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 42.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 57.

¹⁶⁶ Ralph A. Cossa, "US-Japan Defense Cooperation: Can Japan become the Great Britain of Asia? Should it?," Michael H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto eds., in *The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia*, (Stanford: Asia Pacific Research Center, 2004), 97.

transnational terrorism all around the world began. Japan, although contributing economically, has not made many military contributions to this multilateral endeavor. One can claim that the 950 troops sent to Iraq are “boots on the ground,” but Japan made it very clear that it would only deploy its Self-Defense Forces in non-combat zones. Among these pacifist approaches to global security, Japan has been strongly advocating United Nations Security Council reforms.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs openly declared that a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council was one of Japan's major foreign policy goals. Strongly opposed by China and Russia, a permanent seat in the Security Council is quite unlikely for Japan unless the country has the assertive nature, the crucial military capabilities, and the strategic importance for the position. In the Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that Japan's foreign policy aims at securing the safety and prosperity of Japan and the Japanese people, and to that end, it is essential that peace, stability, and prosperity be realized in the international community.¹⁶⁷ As part of securing these goals, Japan aspires to and actively seeks a permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. It is explicitly stated in the bluebook that “Japan intends to build an ideal, concrete vision of the United Nations Security Council for the future, vigorously working to realize its reform, and to achieve permanent membership in the Security Council.”¹⁶⁸

If Japan is to be supported by the West—particularly by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—for its permanent accession to the UN Security Council, then it would be natural for the United States to raise the bar of expectations from Japan, insisting on active participation in peacekeeping

¹⁶⁷ “Message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs,” in *Diplomatic Bluebook 2004*, On-line document, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blubook/2004, accessed on 7 September 2005.

¹⁶⁸ “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blubook/2004, 151, accessed on 7 September 2005.

operations.¹⁶⁹ Only if Japan is willing to become a “normal,” participatory, military power, could the Japanese expect to have more influence on world affairs and continue to be the most significant key ally in Northeast Asia, along with a continued regional leadership role with global significance. Such influential power may very well affect the Japanese economy in a positive direction as well.

By becoming a normal country with a significant military power, Japan must develop a strong military-industrial complex of its own that can significantly contribute to the Japanese economy. Japan already has a massive military industry; however, a Defense News recent report on the top 100 Defense Contractors indicates that the most active defense company in Japan with the highest defense-related revenue is Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Kawasaki ranks fortieth among the top 100 defense contractors. The entire Japanese military industry combined does not even add up to the revenue of the fifteenth largest US defense contractor—Computer Sciences Corp.¹⁷⁰ Although there are initiatives in Japan for strengthening the defense industry, without normalizing, it seems to get tackled constantly by legal barriers because, as a nation dedicated to peace, Japan does not export arms. Reviewing Japanese legislation reveals that Japan not only has strict laws regulating the manufacture, possession, and transfer of arms, but also proscribes the export of arms—hunting guns and sport guns are excluded.¹⁷¹

Strengthening the defense industry will not only benefit the Japanese economy but also Japanese security. For instance, in December 2004, Japan announced that it was committed to work with the United States on

¹⁶⁹ Michael J. Green, “The Forgotten Player-Japan,” On-line article, available at www.findarticles.com, accessed on 7 September 2005.

¹⁷⁰ *Defense News Top 100*, available at <http://www.defensenews.com/content/features/2005chart1.html>, accessed on 7 September 2005.

¹⁷¹ “National Report on the Implementation of Programme of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,” in *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/weapon/report0306.html, accessed on 25 October 2005.

developing anti-missile defense technology, which was, and still is, aimed at the threat from China. On the other hand, the Koizumi government has moved forward with assertive policies in recent months taking sides on sensitive issues such as Taiwan. Prime Minister Koizumi has also paid visits to countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and France, and lobbied for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council—all of which were criticized adamantly by China and Russia. Japan has also decided to invest in ITER,¹⁷² a massive new research project designed to generate electricity from the sort of nuclear fusion that powers the sun. This indicates that Japan is inclined to make significant changes to its foreign policy and security strategy, becoming more activist than pacifist.¹⁷³ With the wealth of industrial, technical, and scientific expertise which Japan commands, if it were to become more active in defense, Japan could quickly become one of the top earners of international defense industry revenues. Along with the defense industry, another economic aspect of normalization becomes apparent: energy security.

An important issue for Japan is energy security. The Japanese government has worked diligently to diversify its energy sources and to secure supplies abroad. Although successful to an extent, Japan remains vulnerable to global oil and gas disruptions, and energy security stands as a key element of the national security agenda. The main problem springs from Japan's need for oil. Despite the decrease in Japanese oil demands, which is roughly less than 50 percent of its total energy use,¹⁷⁴ Japan depends on Persian oil supplies for 80

¹⁷² ITER means "the way" in Latin. ITER is the experimental step between today's studies of plasma physics and tomorrow's electricity-producing fusion power plants. For more information, see "What is ITER," in *ITER*, available at <http://www.iter.org/index.htm>, accessed on 11 October 2005.

¹⁷³ David Wall, "Irking Russia, China: Japan's New Foreign Policy," in *The Japan Times*, Online, available at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?eo20050511a1.htm>, accessed on 11 May 2005.

¹⁷⁴ "Japan Country Analysis Brief, August 2004" *Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration*, available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html>, accessed on 12 October 2005. Also see, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries-Japan 2003 Review," *International Energy Agency-Energy Publications*, available at <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/japan2003.pdf>, 19, accessed on 12 October 2005.

percent of its total oil needs, which in turn makes the country very vulnerable to global oil disruptions.¹⁷⁵ Another factor is that Japan's oil company Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) has produced disappointing results in its efforts to gain control of overseas oil supplies. Japan literally wasted 40 billion dollars on JNOC that met with almost no success.¹⁷⁶

Recent Japanese developments in oil security, however, are promising as Japan, under serious opposition from the United States, completed a long-debated deal with Iran to get exclusive development rights for the Azadegan oil field.¹⁷⁷ In addition, Japan is working with Russia to build a pipeline through Siberia to bring untapped Siberian oil to the Pacific coast at Nakhodka.¹⁷⁸ Although there were rumors that Russia, after the seven billion dollar offer to finance the construction of this pipeline, contracted Japan to build it, so far, Russia has refused to commit to which customer would get deliveries and when. Recently, however, Russian president Vladimir Putin has confirmed that a multibillion-dollar oil pipeline to be built across Siberia will first go to China and only later to the Pacific coast.¹⁷⁹

Another important issue of Japanese energy security is its vast imports of natural gas from Southeast Asia, mainly from the Aceh province of Indonesia. Given that 80 percent of maritime piracy occurs in this region, along

¹⁷⁵ "Japan Country Analysis Brief, August 2004" *Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration*, available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/japan.html>, accessed on 12 October 2005. Also see, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries-Japan 2003 Review," *International Energy Agency-Energy Publications*, available at <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/japan2003.pdf>, 19, accessed on 12 October 2005.

¹⁷⁶ "World Energy Outlook 2002 Edition," *International Energy Agency-Energy Publications*, available at <http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/weo2002.pdf>, 197-236, accessed on 12 October 2005.

¹⁷⁷ "Japan Signs Oilfield Development Deal with Iran despite Opposition from U.S.," *Financial Times*, 19 February 2004, 9.

¹⁷⁸ Edward C. Chow, "Russian Pipelines: Back to the Future?," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2004), 30-31.

¹⁷⁹ "Putin confirms that Siberian oil pipeline will first go to China – WSJ," in *Forbes.com*, Online Journal, 9 July 2005, available at <http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/afx/2005/09/07/afx2209298.html>, accessed on 5 September 2005.

with the volatile security measures in the region, especially after September 11, Japan's share of energy consumption from Indonesian natural gas accounts for some 70 percent. Japan could face serious danger if threats are made to that supply during its transportation.¹⁸⁰ In such unpredictable circumstances, Japan's normalization and the need for constitutional revision became necessary, as none of the above security needs would be directly provided by the United States Security Alliance.

For all of the aforementioned benefits to be obtained by Japan, normalization may be inevitable. The course of Japan's military policy is toward becoming a "normal" military power, and it is obvious that certain Japanese and American policymaking communities are eagerly supporting Japan to assume such a role in world affairs by ending its ban on collective security and fully partaking in multilateral coalitions in East Asia and elsewhere.¹⁸¹ However, Japan has two other options for normalcy.

c. Third Normalization Option

A third option for Japan is to become normal to the extent that it would become independent of the United States and become a regional power ensuring not only its own security but its neighbors' security as well. However, the already suspicious Chinese and Koreans, as well as Southeast Asians, will ask whether this is a new attempt for or a different form of Japanese imperialism, or the revival thereof. In fact, two recent developments appear relevant to Sino-Japanese relations in the wake of Japanese normalization. First, Prime Minister Koizumi's strong support for U.S. policy in Iraq and his unprecedented dispatch of troops and equipment has undoubtedly strengthened long-standing Chinese concerns over increased Japanese military power and Japan's budding interest to undertake military responsibilities beyond the archipelago. Second, the post-

¹⁸⁰ Mikal E. Herberg, "Asia's Energy Insecurity: Cooperation or Conflict," in *Strategic Asia 2004-05* edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington and Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 354-357.

¹⁸¹ Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2004), 206.

September 11 developments—namely, improvement in U.S-China relations and intense U.S focus on combating terrorism—have arguably lessened the U.S.-Japan security alliance's advancement in Asia, thus creating a potential reduction in Sino-Japanese tensions and increasing the opportunity for the emergence of a more cooperative environment between Japan and China. This situation may actually prove that the time has become ripe for Japan to change its constitution and strengthen its military to partake in peace operations around the globe.¹⁸² However, in essence, the region does not appear ready to accept Japanese help in defense matters. Many Asian countries, including China and the two Koreas, have bad memories of their past relations with the Japanese, and they would be more willing to see a “normal” Japan, which is ready to “face the dark side of its past.”¹⁸³ By attempting to increase direct influence on its immediate neighbors, Japan would most probably exacerbate the situation and fail in its attempt to become a strong regional power.

On the other hand, Japan's foreign policy trajectory is not directed towards becoming a regional superpower, thus this option is also very unlikely to take place. The long-standing economic disputes between Japan and the United States have not taken a more serious turn. The United States has continually insisted that Japan open its markets and economic practices, and Japan has not responded with increased intransigence but has chosen to take steps toward openness and deregulation. Initially, the post-Cold War domestic realignment¹⁸⁴ in Japan caused frustration in the West lest Japan strongly commit to mercantilist policies. Even though Japan followed protectionist economic policies for

¹⁸² Michael D. Swaine, “China: Exploiting a Strategic Opening,” in *Strategic Asia 2004-05* edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington and Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 82-83. .

¹⁸³ Shiping Tang, “Waiting for a ‘Normal’ Japan,” in *Asia Times Online*, 7 January 2004, available at www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FA07Dh02.html, accessed on 30 August 2005.

¹⁸⁴ Domestic realignment simply refers to the LDP's loss of its majority in the Diet in 1993 for the first time in 38 years. Morihiro Hosokawa, the then-Prime Minister of Japan, formed an eight-party coalition government which promised a series of social, political, and economic reforms. This incident raised doubts in the West about Japanese politics in the post-Cold War environment.

decades, the Japanese prime minister's 1999 reaffirmation of a commitment to deregulation and greater openness and the primacy of the security treaty with the United States, however, eliminated such suspicions and fears.¹⁸⁵ Although John Mearsheimer claims that Japan is showing signs of independent behavior as there remains a lack of a galvanizing threat, Japan and the United States reaffirmed their commitment to the security treaty, which leaves no room for suspicion. For example, even though President Clinton's 9-day visit to China for the purpose of improving Sino-U.S. relations may have been interpreted as a sign for weakening of the Japan-U.S. relationship, the Japanese Diet's 1999 legislation for further expansion of partnership with the United States proved the exact opposite, which invalidates pointless suspicions about the alliance's future.¹⁸⁶

In 2001, Mearsheimer predicted that Japan is not likely to remain a ward of the United States and is likely to establish itself as a great power, yet recent developments such as Japanese involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq reiterates that Japan will continue to be a crucial and loyal ally of the United States regardless of establishing itself as a normal country.¹⁸⁷ The political-military partnership and cooperation with Japan has increased significantly during the Bush administration. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his government have a successful track record of being loyal strategic partners even though there remain constraints arising from Japanese economic difficulties and political differences. Japanese support in the war on terrorism is unmatched in Northeast Asia. Koizumi outspokenly supported the U.S.-led attack on Iraq and was eager to deploy several hundred Japanese soldiers to Iraq. Although criticized for his

¹⁸⁵ Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 252.

¹⁸⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 391-392.

¹⁸⁷ Mearsheimer, 532.

meeting with Kim Jong Il in September 2002 for overlooking U.S. interests, the Japanese Prime Minister meticulously coordinated his 2004 visit to Pyongyang with the United States.¹⁸⁸

Moreover, realists interpreted that Japanese nationalists are victorious for three reasons. First, Japan has the second largest defense budget in the world. Second, it is developing its own spy satellites against the wishes of the United States. Third, it has established commissions in the Diet to review its pacifist constitution. Realist interpretations that Japan is pursuing an independent policy constitute nothing but prejudice as they ignore Japan's actions, which display its intention to assist the West at large and the United States in particular in promoting global peace and stability.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand, the future growth of China will continue to raise concerns in Japan, which will lead the Japanese to even closer strategic cooperation with the West, particularly the United States. Thus, fears that Japan may throw its weight to the Chinese and strike an accord with them by breaking its alliance with the United States appear quite unfounded as well.¹⁹⁰

Although the likelihood of Japan attempting to grow into a regional hegemon is still there, without a gradual normalization process, this would be a step too-long that would in the short and long run severely hurt Japanese interests. This option could optimistically be operationalized within two decades if Japan begins to normalize in the next couple of years. Japan first has to prove itself to have good intentions toward the region, and then and only then, can it help its neighbors. Otherwise, its neighbors would neither be enthusiastic nor prepared to receive help from Japan. In addition, it will draw serious criticism and maybe threats from some of its neighbors.

¹⁸⁸ Sutter, 53.

¹⁸⁹ Mearsheimer, 531.

¹⁹⁰ Russett and Oneal, 294.

d. Fourth Normalization Option

Along the lines of the previous option, the world is not ready to see Japan as another superpower running security business around the world. Japan does not even have a permanent seat in United Nations Security Council, so the fourth option of a Japanese brand of Wilsonianism would spread Japan too thin. Russett and Oneal posit that Japan, having experienced catastrophic and debilitating costs after the Second World War for following realpolitik principles, now largely follows liberal policies.¹⁹¹ According to Russett and Oneal, Japan suffered in the past and thus has absorbed painful lessons to build a Kantian system of perpetual peace. The authors believe that the Japanese would never attempt to stage similar imperialistic ambitions that took place during or before the Second World War regardless of their trade disagreements with other countries.¹⁹² This has proved to be the case for Japan for over 60 years. Thus, Japanese Wilsonianism is a farfetched policy option. Japan could take such an action half a century from now, and one can never predict in detail what may happen so far in the future. For instance, in 1950, nobody could have foreseen the end of the Cold War that was to happen two score years later. Thus, such an option is neither likely nor wise to plan for even in the long run. After assessing all these options, there seems to be only one rational choice for Japan.

D. THE BEST OPTION

What is the reasonable option for Japan? Upfront, the most reasonable option for Japan appears to be the second normalization option, which prescribes strengthening its military not only to provide for its own defense but also to help the United States in security matters around the world. This would bring mutual benefits to both Japan and the United States. Besides, it would be valuable for the West to see Japan help the United States in security matters. In addition, Japan has proved to be better at operating with the United States than on its

¹⁹¹ Russett and Oneal, 34.

¹⁹² Ibid, 196.

own. According to Chalmers Johnson, states G. John Ikenberry, Japan finds itself better able to operate in formal bilateral relations whereas the United States proved to be more organized than Japan in its far-flung multilateral relations. As a result of such historical tendencies and internal organizational characteristics, the incentives of Japan and the United States to create and operate within multilateral organizations differ.¹⁹³ The U.S.-Japan security alliance has gone through a renewal process in the 1990s. The two nations saw a great benefit in reaffirming their security partnership and developed more sophisticated forms of military cooperation, contingency planning, and burden sharing. Fifteen years after the Cold War, the bilateral U.S.-Japanese alliance seems to be as strong as it was—if not more than before. This indicates that the alliance remains strong despite the end of the Cold War or the rise and the fall of a specific regional or global security threat. Many Japanese see the security relationship with the U.S. as a way to render the bilateral ties more stable by binding each to the other.¹⁹⁴

Mearsheimer argues that Japan, although a potential hegemon in its region, will never become a threat to either Northeast Asia or the world at large. He maintains that Japan has a relatively small population and is an insular state with significant barriers against power-projection. He believes that it is unlikely that Japan could carry out an attack on mainland Asia, and it is unlikely that Japan will shake loose from the United States and become a great power in its region as it would terrify China, the two Koreas, and Russia. These formidable adversaries would become determined to use their militaries against any Japanese attack on mainland Asia. In this worst case scenario, Japanese normalcy would not make war more or less likely, but rather would lead to a balanced Asia even if the United States exited the region.¹⁹⁵ Also, strengthening Japan's cooperation with Southeast Asia has been a priority of Prime Minister

¹⁹³ Ikenberry, 61. Chalmers Johnson gave a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania on 2 April 1996 called *Power and Paralysis: Japan as a Superpower*. Ikenberry cites this lecture in one of his footnotes.

¹⁹⁴ Ikenberry, 249.

¹⁹⁵ Mearsheimer, 396-400.

Koizumi since his May 2002 address on “The Future of Asia.” While Washington continues to emphasize bilateral relations both in economics and for the war on terrorism, Tokyo desires to be a core participant in the region’s transformation, which indicates that the region is ready to see a supportive Japan.¹⁹⁶

Analyzed from the economic and political perspectives and synthesized in the light of Japanese national interests, normal statehood seems an inevitable consequence of Japan’s increasing role in world affairs. It is almost tempting to state that Japan has even been late in becoming a “normal” military power partaking in the United States’ coalition in ensuring peace and stability around the world while assisting developing and underdeveloped countries to become affable actors of the international arena.

E. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BEST OPTION AS THE NEW JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

While Japan continues to deal with challenges both at home and abroad, and yet prospects for sustainable economic growth remain uncertain, in order to operationalize the most reasonable option for normalization, Japan should ensure that at least three important tasks are conducted. The first one stands out as the most important: constitutional revision. In the current political scene, with both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan supporting a constitutional amendment including the revision of Article 9, and the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party permanently weakened, the debate on a constitutional amendment has entered a new phase: the issue is now how the constitution is to be revised. Although some claim that a revised constitution will essentially be a reworded version of the present constitution except for the recognition of the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, Japan, in order to normalize, must act wisely to avoid such word games. On the other hand, some polls have shown that about 70-80 percent of the public says that the war-renouncing Article 9 should not be amended. Conclusions that

¹⁹⁶ Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia: Back to the Future,” in *Strategic Asia 2004-05* edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington and Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), 285-286.

the public is apparently not interested in a general revision of the constitution are unfounded because when asked by pollsters and pushed for an answer, opinion is about evenly split, for and against revision, which has been the pattern for decades. At times, most Japanese polled simply did not know what to make of the constitution. In other words, it has not functioned as the source of national unity and loyalty.¹⁹⁷ Even though many polls would result in a lack of public support for constitutional change, particularly revision of Article 9, the politicians are inclined towards revision. One example of how public opinion can differ from policy and be successful was the sending of troops to Iraq, which 80 percent of the population did not support, yet Koizumi pushed for it and ordered Japanese troops dispatched to Iraq to a non-combat zone. In a similar fashion, constitutional revision is likely to happen soon as well.¹⁹⁸

While both the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party are opposed to changing the Constitution (Article 9, in particular, which renounces war), the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, is in favor of pushing ahead with revising the Constitution—including revisions to the controversial issues relating to the deployment of the country's Self-Defense Forces as well as Japanese participation in collective self-defense. Changing the Constitution so that Japan can take part in collective defense may be the price Japan must pay to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.¹⁹⁹

The second important task Japan must deal with is to make the necessary adjustments to its budget. It is not as easy and as economical to have a military capable of conducting operations around the world. Japan definitely does have the resources to successfully partake in such endeavors; however, a detailed plan on how to appropriate those resources and, in fact, how further to increase

¹⁹⁷ Masaru Tamamoto, "A land without Patriots," in *World Policy Journal*. New York: Fall 2001. Vol. 18, Iss. 3; 33.

¹⁹⁸ Morrison, 109-110.

¹⁹⁹ Shigenori Okazaki, "Koizumi Uncovered," in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jun 2005. Vol. 168, Iss. 6; 23.

the already-allocated defense budget must be meticulously crafted by Japanese budget analysts and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.

The third important task to be conducted by Japan is to ensure a smooth transition from its current operations to a state of normalcy. Depending on the definition of normalization, one can claim that Japan has been normalizing since the early 1980s and has built upon this trend of military strengthening. In particular, Prime Minister Koizumi has played a key role in accelerating and further developing this form of normalization—characterized by shifting away from Japan’s stridently anti-military pacifist culture—after the September 11 terrorist attacks.²⁰⁰ This trend has worked to Japan’s advantage, yet there remains no need for Japan or its politicians to strike a chord about the past enmities with its Asian neighbors. In this sense, it would be a wise idea for Koizumi, for instance, to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and for Diet members like Masahiro Morioka to avoid making such farfetched and mind-boggling claims that the Tokyo Tribunal was a show trial where such notions as crime against peace and humanity were arbitrarily made by the Allied Powers.²⁰¹ This would only work to exasperate Japan’s neighbors and exacerbate the situation, which would then frustrate and delay the normalization process if not fully impede it.

F. CONCLUSION

It is apparent that with the policies of its reformist premier, a new Japan is emerging. Although more nationalistic and more assertive than before, the basic Japanese strategic calculus has remarkably remained the same as before, continuing the post-World War II legacy of anti-militarism. Japan pursues a comprehensive strategy of integrating its security and economic interests. The alliance with the United States serves as the foundation of Japanese physical security. Although Mochizuki claims that there is little reason for Japan to adopt a military posture or doctrine independent of or less reliant on the United

²⁰⁰ Mochizuki, 105.

²⁰¹ Ayako Doi and Kim Willenson, “Sayonara to Japanese Pacifism,” in *The Washington Post*, (Washington D.C.: August 14, 2005), B04.

States,²⁰² and Japanese defense policy continues to adamantly avoid partaking directly in combat operations overseas with or without the United States, the reformist Koizumi government has been working to implement such changes while continuing to strengthen the alliance with the United States. Recent political and domestic developments have encouraged speculation that Japan is using the military to assume a higher international profile, and Japan has a right to play such a military role as long as it does not breach its own legal and constitutional constraints.²⁰³ The Japanese have always understood that even though the U.S. alliance was essential, it did not suffice to make Japan more secure and prosperous.²⁰⁴

If the constitution were amended to permit Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, such a transformation would reflect a major change in national identity, and therefore, would lead to a significant change in its national security strategy. Although such a change would alter the Japanese political posture in the global scene, Japan could and most probably should remain closely allied to the United States even after such a monumental change. Some political scientists would suggest that Japan could become an ally more akin to Britain actively participating in overseas missions together with the United States.²⁰⁵ Although the concept of normalcy has taken a place in Japan's defense agenda, the definition of a normal country has remained vague. In this context, scholars have reflected upon different types of normalcy that Japan potentially can follow including the examples of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; however, what constitutes the standards for Japanese normalization have yet to be fully explored and agreed upon. Takashi Inoguchi makes a similar argument and recommends the British example as more appropriate since

²⁰² Mochizuki, 105.

²⁰³ Yumiko Nakagawa, "Japan: The high cost of being 'normal,'" in *Asia Times Online*, 29 November 2002, available at www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DK29Dh01.html, accessed on 30 August 2005.

²⁰⁴ Mochizuki, 104

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 128.

France and Germany do not share similarities with Japan in relation to the United States.²⁰⁶ Along similar lines, the Armitage-Nye Report of October 2000, prepared by a group of U.S. foreign policy experts co-chaired by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Lee Armitage, argued that the goal of the U.S.-Japan alliance should be the special relationship similar to that of the United States and Britain.²⁰⁷

On the other hand, Mike Mochizuki claims that neither the French nor the British model is suitable for Japan. He contends that the British model is a step too far for Japan as it would not only become a strong military partner but also an important regional military power that can threaten its neighbors. As for the French model, a Gaullist alternative is unlikely as it requires a considerable degree of autonomy and the emergence of Japan as a serious nuclear power. He claims that the German model is far more befitting as the Japanese international outlook and behavior continues to be shaped by Japan's militarist past. He contends that it is wise for Japan to continue a strong alliance with the United States while cultivating an environment in the Asia-Pacific region hospitable for Japan's long term economic and security interests.²⁰⁸

It is important for Japan to search for role models and learn lessons from its friends in the West; however, it is more important that Japan acts as itself. As a result of such a search for a role model, a definitional problem of what constitutes normalcy may arise. Such semantic arguments are irrelevant for the normalization of Japan because what constitutes a "not normal" state seems to be obvious, and almost all scholars would concur that Japan is "not normal." Thus, Japan should evaluate itself with its own capabilities and in accordance with its own geopolitical and geostrategic importance. Japan can only afford to continue its alliance with the United States, and it would benefit from normal

²⁰⁶ Inoguchi, 2-4.

²⁰⁷ Mochizuki, 129.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 129-131.

statehood in security-related and economic interests along with establishing a firm regional leadership with an increasing global significance.

V. IMPACTS OF JAPANESE NORMALIZATION

This chapter analyzes Japanese political change in the post-Cold War era by assessing the impacts of a normal Japan. As a corollary to the main argument of this thesis, this chapter argues that Japanese normalization will have mixed impacts, and Japan must act cautiously to pursue its national interests, especially toward China. The impacts of a normal Japan can be best categorized under three views. These are welcoming reactions, adamant opposition, and indifference. The West—the United States in particular—will welcome a normal Japan. Northeast Asia—namely China and the two Koreas—and Southeast Asia are unwilling to see a normal Japan and remain wary and hesitant at best. Russia, South Asia, and the rest of the world in general are rather indifferent to a normal Japan with differing approaches from time to time.

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi took office in April 2001 and has insisted on expanding the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' mission, first by approving deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean, and later on with the domestically unpopular decision to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, Iraq.²⁰⁹ Recently, on 10 December 2004, the Koizumi administration published an update to the 1996 National Defense Program Outline and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Forces Reorganization Plan.²¹⁰ This plan has increased the speed of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' shift away from being only a self-defense force capable of operating with the United States in defense of Japan to that of a globally

²⁰⁹ Toru Hayano, "Self-Serving Utilization of Opinion Poll Data," in *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 December 2004, available at <http://www.asahi.com/column/hayano/eng/TKY200412170133.html>, accessed on 8 November 2005. In this article, it is reported that according to a joint Asahi Shimbun and Uruk Shimbun poll in November 2004, 62 percent of Japanese people opposed extending the deployment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces in Iraq.

²¹⁰ "National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005," in *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html, accessed on 9 November 2005. Also see, "Japan's new 'Outline of Defense Plan' analyzed," in *People's Daily Online*, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200412/16/eng20041216_167628.html, accessed on 9 November 2005.

recognized force proficient to conduct a wide spectrum of operations in unstable geopolitical environments throughout the globe. While there remains a long legal and doctrinal way to go for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces before Japan can operate as a “normal” country, Japan’s increased military participation in world affairs has triggered suspicions among regional neighbors, whose assessments are often quite different from those of the United States or Japan. Should Japan become a normal country, China, the two Koreas, and the Southeast Asian countries may interpret such transformation as a comeback of Japanese militarism and perceive Japan as a threat. This chapter will now assess the Japanese national interests and the global impacts of a normal Japan.

A. JAPAN’S NATIONAL INTERESTS

Japan's national interests obviously lay in its security and continued prosperity while also engaging the world diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Japan’s primary national interest is to ensure its safety, security, and prosperity while promoting a peaceful society. In light of this, Japan views its territory, its surrounding region, the Persian Gulf resource area, and the Sea Lines of Communication from the Persian Gulf to Japan as its main security interests. Since the end of the Cold War, China and North Korea have become significant threats to Japan. Additionally, piracy in Southeast Asia and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have increased. In this context, Japan needs an even stronger alliance with the United States than ever before.²¹¹

B. U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

The United States-Japanese security alliance has been constantly evolving since its inception following the Second World War. Both the United States and Japan face an increasingly complex international scene, and must rely on strong allies to achieve national security. Although the relationship between Tokyo and Washington has sometimes been bumpy, its historical route is directed to increasing ties between the two nations. Incontestably, decision makers in both countries have agreed that the current bilateral alliance stands

²¹¹ Riichi Furugaki, “Collective Self-Defense for Japan,” in *Japan Watch CSIS*, May 2000, available at <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/jw000501.pdf>, accessed on 8 November 2005.

essential to their respective security interests.²¹² Shared interests and threats have pushed Japan and the United States to tighten their alliance, and the two nations will continue to grow in their interdependence. The United States has openly expressed its intentions to see a normal Japan. Even though some policymakers and political scientists remain wary of a strong, militarily capable Japan, the actual United States policy has been welcoming of a “normal” Japan.

The Japanese-American alliance has its roots in the American occupation of Japan following World War II. Unwilling to permit any hint of militarism, the United States specifically aimed to cultivate a national culture of anti-militarism, which was eagerly adopted by the war-weary Japanese population. This had the effect of prohibiting the establishment of a Japanese military and making the United States responsible for Japan’s security in the early stages of the cold war. In the post-Cold War era, Japanese anti-militarism came to be criticized, however.²¹³

In late 2004, the most recent revisions of the National Defense Guidelines and the Japanese Military Assessment were published. These documents favored a strengthened alliance with the United States, specifically named both North Korea and China as threats for the first time, and suggested constitutional revision to Article 9.²¹⁴ Although there have been indications, Japan has yet to formally discuss constitutional reform. As a result of the recent trends in U.S.-Japan relations, speculating about the growth of Japanese military contributions to the alliance would not be farfetched.

In addition to the American encouragement, Japan has another motive in moving towards normality. The prospect of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council would provide Japan an international voice

²¹² Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 98.

²¹³ Hughes, *Japan’s Security Agenda*, 160.

²¹⁴ “National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005,” in *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html, accessed on 9 November 2005.

proportionate to its economic influence. Japan has historically been highly involved with the United Nations, but has relied upon the United States for its security. Japan contributes nearly 20% of the U.N.'s budget, significantly more than any other nation except the United States.²¹⁵ Both Washington and Tokyo would like to see Japan possess a more influential voice in the United Nations.

Washington welcomes Tokyo's moves towards normalizing its defense capabilities and assuming a more prominent role in the bilateral alliance. The United States has found itself embroiled in the global war on terror, and is always eager for contributors to its "coalition of the willing." As previously noted, Japan has most recently contributed logistical support to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and has also assumed a prominent role in reconstruction. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Japan currently has 550 ground SDF soldiers in Iraq to assist in reconstruction efforts. Their deployment marks the first time since 1945 that Japanese soldiers have entered a war zone. Washington views the prospect of constitutional reform and Japanese defense normality as desirable and positive, sharing the feeling of the majority of Japanese policy makers and the Japanese population. Historically, the United States has been careful not to be seen as the catalyst for Japanese political reform. Despite Washington's lack of enthusiasm to become involved in Japanese domestic politics, the Bush administration has recently called for changes to Article 9, and the then-Secretary of State Colin Powell said that Japan must revise Article 9 if it wants to gain membership on the United Nations Security Council.²¹⁶

C. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

China perceives any Japanese military advance as a threat to its security, yet Japan remains crucial in a continued Chinese economic development. China will most likely continue to veto Japanese application for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council if Japan becomes a normal country, and

²¹⁵ Mark Manyin, W. Cooper, R.P. Cronin, and L.A. Niksch, "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress," in *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, updated on 2 August 2005, 11.

²¹⁶ *Ibid*, 9.

even worse, a conflict may break out between Japan and China if the tensions escalate. Despite these possibilities, China, in the current state of affairs, cannot afford a hot war or a severe economic confrontation against Japan provided that it wishes to continue its economic development.

Japan named China a threat in its 2004 military assessment. Because of China's significant impact on Northeast Asian security, its continued enhancement of nuclear and missile capabilities, and vigorous efforts of modernization of its navy and air force while expanding marine activities, Japan sees a need to continue to watch Chinese moves in the future.²¹⁷ There have been enormous Chinese efforts to modernize the People's Liberation Army, and in that context, China has acquired Russian made nuclear submarines, surface destroyers, and other conventional armaments.²¹⁸ These improvements in the Chinese armed forces have alarmed many Japanese leaders who distrust many of Beijing's motives. While North Korea exhibits the most overt hostility against Japan, China is potentially a far more dangerous enemy with its vastly superior armed forces and its massive economy. Recent diplomatic bickering over historical issues has not improved relations between the two nations, even though they remain heavily involved as trading partners.

China and Japan celebrated the 30th anniversary of their normalization in 2002. The relations between China and Japan continue to grow stronger, especially economically. China has surpassed the United States as the number one exporter to Japan, and Japan is China's largest trading partner.²¹⁹ As the economies of China and Japan become more interdependent, the importance of the security of the sea-lanes and keeping goods and services flowing will

²¹⁷ "National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005," in *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html, accessed on 9 November 2005.

²¹⁸ Subhash Kapila, "Japan's Revised Threat Perceptions and Military Up-Gradation Plans: An Analysis," in *South Asia Analysis Group*, available at <http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1204.html>, accessed on 9 November 2005.

²¹⁹ "Diplomatic Bluebook 2003," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/index.html>, accessed on 10 November 2005.

increase in Northeast Asia as well. Despite the growing economic interaction, there are still issues from the past that affect present day relations.

China represents the greatest competition economically, militarily, and politically to Japan. While Japan remains the greatest economic power in Asia, China has had a larger percentage of GDP growth over the past several years and shows no signs of slowing down. China has also become the world's top recipient of foreign direct investment. Militarily, China has the largest standing army at just over two million troops and continues to modernize its military. China's military spending in 2004 increased 11.6 percent over the 2003 budget of 185.3 billion yuan (22.37 billion dollars).²²⁰

As China continues to grow economically and modernize militarily, it has the potential to become the regional hegemon and potentially become the next superpower to compete with the United States. Thus, China would not welcome a fully "normalized" Japan. Japan would present greater competition as a "normalized" country with the ability to project power. Furthermore, it would be most beneficial for China if Japan stayed under the United States' security lid. China could then focus on the United States as its major competitor knowing that Japan is under control. On the other hand, a normalized Japan could be used as a balance by China against the United States, a remote possibility which some U.S. policymakers fear from.

While Japan and China are close neighbors, they have disputes over a number of issues. Despite these issues, Tokyo desires to eliminate Beijing's skepticism about the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance. China has numerous concerns over the recently revised Japanese Defense Guidelines. In addition, Chinese leaders who watch Japan closely believe that Japanese Self-Defense Forces have transformed greatly and, with the support of the United States, will play a much stronger role in the coming future. The Chinese are afraid that the

²²⁰ "China to boost military strength, build high-tech weapons," in *Channel News Asia*, 5 March 2004, available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/73984/1/.html, accessed on 9 November 2005.

United States does not plan to keep Japan in check militarily, which in turn, may result in Japan engaging in collective self-defense.

The future of relations between China and Japan continues to be one of the major focal points of discussion in East Asia. Chinese leaders have been cautious of a remilitarized Japan since its defeat in the Second World War. China is primarily opposed to Japan's nationalistic moves. China is also opposed to the expansion of Japan's military mission in a global environment. This is primarily due to the concern that global ambitions will lead to a militarist Japan's resurgence. For the predictable future, the greatest obstacle to improved security relations between Beijing and Tokyo will be the resolution of historical issues. Solving these problems is not something that Japan can do alone. Japan must have a greater understanding of how deep the historical issues run in China. Beijing, for its part, must be ready to abandon its use of historical issues as a foreign policy tool and work with Japan to truly resolve the issues. Fears of reemergence of a militarist Japan similar to that which affected all of Asia in the first half of the twentieth century will keep Chinese planners nervously observing Japanese improvements in the near term.

D. KOREAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Both Koreas are suspicious of a militarily strong Japan; however, reactions of a unified Korea—an important political and geographic change that may take years to happen—is unknown at this stage. Although allied through their respective alliances with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and Japan are still politically confrontational. South Korea's historical antagonism and threat perception of the Japanese in general coupled with the Japanese sometimes contemptuous approaches toward Koreans at large and South Koreans, in particular, obstruct advancement of neighborly and constructive relations. South Korea's response to a normal Japan will most likely be one of implicit approval with harsh criticism. South Korean responses hinge mainly on how it would affect the North Korean reunification dialogues and the security situation. The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK or North

Korea) shares China's ideological and realist opposition to increased Japanese military activity. North Korea's likely opposition to a normal Japan does not stand as a very significant factor, however. In many ways, its opposition would have far less impact than challenges coming from China. Although the DPRK presents an open threat to Japan through its missile program, it is quite uncertain that it would risk the retaliation of the United States by threatening Japan.

The two Koreas both share a common history with Japan up until the end of the Second World War. The DPRK is probably Japan's greatest perceived threat, and it continues to be the most unpredictable and rogue actor in Northeast Asian security matters. The ROK would experience considerable anxiety over a normal Japan given its past uncomfortable position toward Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations. South Korea is anxious about a more militarily active Japan, but there is common ground to work upon to improve the relationship: their common ally, the United States. One possibility is that Japanese military involvement in United Nations activities actually might spark greater military cooperation between South Korea and Japan if they were involved in the same operation in a distant and neutral setting.

While Japanese relations with the DPRK have been focused more on the desire to obtain security guarantees, and Japan's relations with China have often revolved around maintaining a balance of power, relations between Japan and South Korea have been more complicated. Japan and South Korea are both allies of the United States and therefore de facto allies of each other. At the same time, both are also increasingly regional economic and political competitors and suffer from a strong historical distrust. This has created a situation where Japan and South Korea's security relationship is increasingly influenced by political actions in both Tokyo and Seoul. South Korea, like China, is concerned that the Japanese military deployments overseas are a sign of current efforts in the Japanese government to develop an independent security policy. Unlike China, South Korea has no interest in seeing the U.S.–Japan security relationship deteriorate. The major concern that Seoul has regarding Tokyo is

operations outside of the U.S.–Japan security framework. South Korea and Japan have made some headway recently to keep this issue from interfering with security issues, but an underlying resentment remains.

North Korea, Japan's perceived main threat, has developed its nationalism over decades through constantly disparaging both Japanese and American imperialism. Pyongyang speculates about being threatened by both nations, and will undoubtedly condemn any moves by Japan to strengthen its military and its relationship with the United States. Pyongyang, no doubt, will condemn Japan's constitutional reform provided that it happens in the future, and will treat such reforms as evidence of remilitarization of the Japanese society. South Korea shares similar historical animosity towards Japan as other nations in the region, and has been outspoken against past Japanese aggression and its apparent dismissal of historical wrongdoings.

Victor Cha acknowledges the importance of history that has passed between Japan and Korea and adds that the emotionalism produced because of this history continues to plague the relations between the archipelago and the peninsula. He further adds that although history does tinge the interaction between Japan and Korea, it is mainly the larger geostrategic concerns—the broader realpolitik matters and unease between Korea and Japan and the Korean patriotism, which Cha equates to anti-Japanism—that ultimately determine political outcomes.²²¹

E. RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

The basic bilateral relationship between Japan and Russia revolves around geography and economics. Since the mid-1700s, Japan and Russia advanced rival claims to the Kurile Islands. The Japanese and Russian views of one another are based on this long history of competitive aims in the North Pacific and North Asia. Russo-Japanese trade relations are centered on Siberia, which has the potential to be a major supplier of energy for Japan. Siberia has

²²¹ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle*, (Stanford: Stanford University press, 1999), 231-232.

reserves of oil, natural gas, timber, coal, and ores that are necessary to Japan, a resource importer.²²² Analysis of these historical relations on geography and trade presents a complex picture, which implies that Russia will most likely remain indifferent towards Japanese constitutional reforms and the strengthening of Self-Defense Forces.

During the thirteen years between 1968 and 1981, Japan signed six agreements with Russia related to the development of Siberian natural resources.²²³ Even though remains a modest form of trade, Japan and Russia have used coastal trade since 1963 to supplement their regular trade and used it as a means to maintain a bilateral relationship that benefits both countries.²²⁴ Although economic relations flourished, the political relations were not as friendly during the Cold War. However, recent developments have indicated that Russians and Japanese have been assuming more friendly postures. In February 2004, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Losyukov, stated that:

Active work to advance the interests of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most important objectives of Russian diplomacy. No one doubts that Russia and Japan belong among the leading states of this region, on which the future character of the Asian-Pacific community and its formation and subsequent development trends largely depend. Hence the need for the close cooperation of our countries. The bilateral political dialogue, including that at the highest level, is characterized by growing intensity and the enhancement of confidentiality. It is of fundamental importance that both sides are underscoring their strategic interest in their further rapprochement, both at the political and at the public levels. Developing the energy dialogue with

²²² "Siberia (region)," in *MSN Encarta*, available at [http://uk.encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761556603/Siberia_\(region\).html](http://uk.encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761556603/Siberia_(region).html), accessed on 12 November 2005.

²²³ Herbert J. Ellison, *Japan and The Pacific Quadrille: The Major Powers in East Asia*, (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1987), 143.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, 142-143.

Japan, in my opinion, is the key aspect of our trade-and-economic collaboration. We are disposed to work closely in this field with Japan.²²⁵

Russia and Japan continue to enhance their cooperation within the international antiterrorist coalition. The two countries have established relations between their defense and security agencies, the goal of which is to maintain and strengthen the military and political stability in the Northeast Asian region.²²⁶

Despite the aforementioned development of positive relations, Russia would greet a Japanese adoption of normalcy with mixed feelings and concern. Russia continues to see Japan in the light of its role in the American Cold War coalition, in addition to its much longer history of competition for influence in Northeast Asia. Similarly, Japan approaches Russia with hesitancy and views it as a difficult and hostile neighbor.²²⁷ Although relations with newly reorganized Russia proved to be better than they had been with the Soviet Union, the Japanese, for many years even in the post-Cold War era, found it difficult to change their guard stance toward their old foe. The 1992 Japanese Defense White Paper stated this clearly, declaring that although the Cold War had ended, the threat of Russia remained.²²⁸

Both Japan and Russia share a common concern over Chinese military developments. Even though Russians may pose a threat to Japanese energy security, they generally view Japan as a source of balance against a strong China. As a result, they have yet to signal any reaction to a normal Japan except vetoing the Japanese application for permanent United Nations Security Council

²²⁵ "Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov's Interview with ITAR-TASS News Agency on the Questions of Russian-Japanese Relations," in *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department* official website, available at <http://www.in.mid.ru/BI.nsf/arh/31C7E29150FB4F38C3256E390051C54C?OpenDocument>, accessed on 12 November 2005.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Wolf Mendl, *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security & Global Interests*, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 52.

²²⁸ Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 9.

membership. Russians plan to veto Japanese accession mainly because they are inclined to keep the number of members in the Security Council limited to five in order to remain more influential in world affairs and receive a larger share of the power pie around the globe. An expected Russian veto does not signal any discouragement of Japanese normalization.

F. SOUTHEAST ASIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Relations between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began informally in 1973 and were formalized in 1977.²²⁹ The relations between ASEAN and Japan have predominantly been economic. Some of the shared security interests between ASEAN and Japan include maritime safety against piracy and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which provides for a multilateral security dialogue between Japan and the ASEAN countries.²³⁰ The fact that the security relations between Japan and the countries of ASEAN have only recently begun does not rule out the premise that the ASEAN countries would oppose Japan assuming a greater military role within the region. However, the recent trend with an increasing acceleration of being accepted by most of the countries in the region is to view Japan as a “balancer” against China. The historical legacy of Japanese imperialism in Southeast Asia is somewhat retreating in the popular mind, as evidenced in a 1998 Southeast Asian public opinion poll, where the overwhelming majority of the respondents saw Japan as a trustworthy partner that would not become a military threat.²³¹ Southeast Asia, while having economic connections with Japan and some recent initiatives of strategic cooperation, is unwilling to accept Japan's bid for normalization unless it provides a strong balance of power against China.

²²⁹ “Japan - ASEAN Relations,” in *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/overview.html>, accessed on 12 November 2005.

²³⁰ “Diplomatic Bluebook 2004,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website*, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004, 151, accessed on 12 November 2005.

²³¹ Sandra R. Leavitt, *The Lack Of Security Cooperation Between Southeast Asia And Japan: Yen Yes, Pax Nippon No*, available at <http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/pdf/10.1525/as.2005.45.2.216?cookieSet=1>, accessed on 12 November 2005, 229. This article was published in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, Issue 2, 216–240.

Japan's history of aggression and occupation in Southeast Asia serves as constant reminder of what a "militarized" Japan is capable of; however, the aforementioned 1998 public opinion poll indicated that many of the past memories have been taking new shapes as economic development becomes more important than historical enmities. Therefore, the remote possibility that a normal Japan would be welcomed by ASEAN exists, but a realistic approach indicates that currently, Southeast Asian nations are neither eager nor supportive of a normal, militarily strong Japan.

G. CONCLUSION

The reaction to Japan's normalization in summary is American support, Chinese and Korean suspicion and opposition, and Russian indifference. Even though Southeast Asian nations remain unsupportive at large, their reaction is not as significant as that of Northeast Asian players and the Americans. On a further note, South and Central Asian regions are relevant, but their reactions are not as significant either. However, a well thought-out Japanese foreign policy should take into account the reactions from the nuclear powers of South Asia, namely India and Pakistan, as well as the resource rich countries of Central Asia. In the end, no significant barrier stands against Japanese normalization; however, Japan must follow cautious and amicable relations with China in order to achieve its goals, particularly permanent accession to the UN Security Council.

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VI. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND ASSESSMENTS

This thesis analyzed Japanese political change in the post-Cold War era. In order to be a complete and thorough analysis, it reviewed the history of Japan, assessed Japanese foreign policy in the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras, and evaluated the question of a normal Japan and its impacts on Japan's foreign relations with its neighbors. Two central themes emerged as a result of this study. First, Japan should become a normal country because it would benefit Japanese interests by advancing Japan's regional leadership and increasing its global significance, increasing the likelihood of Japan's accession to the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member, which then would increase Japanese influence on world affairs; and improving Japan's economy in both the short and the long run. Second, no significant barrier stands against Japanese normalization; however, Japan must follow cautious and amicable relations with China in order to achieve its goals, particularly permanent accession to the UN Security Council. These central themes were reached due to the following findings and assessments.

Throughout its history, which is replete with internal rivalry and conflict, Japan never posed significant aggression in its foreign policy with expansionist and adventurist characteristics—with the exception of an insignificant expedition to Korea in the 1590s—before the Meiji Restoration. Hoping to lift itself up to an equal footing with the rest of the great powers in the era of imperialism, Japan slipped into a defective path of militarism, which brought its unfortunate downfall at the end of the Second World War. The aggressive 1930s and the warring 1940s have taught significant lessons to the Japanese, which are so well engrained in their culture and so well instilled in their minds that any expectation of aggression from them is lame. A normal, assertive, and objective Japan mobilizing its latent economic power to help the stabilizing powers of the world would only benefit stability, peace, and world harmony.

Japan has been in the center of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region since the early 20th century, and it surfaced as the most dynamic economic center in Asia after the Second World War. The Japanese economy has global significance and its geopolitical location rests in the heart of American, Chinese, and Russian interests, which makes it obvious that Japan is an important regional actor.²³² Japan's role in the global context, however, remains somewhat mysterious. The Japanese quietness and inactivity in world political affairs after the end of the Second World War has led many scholars to attribute this lack of activity to the American protection of Japan. The Japanese domestic politics that emerged after 1952 also played a significant role in Japanese anti-militarism and pacifism.²³³

A marked shift in Japan's security role in both regional and international affairs has become apparent in the post-Cold War context. Japan could no longer continue its Cold War policies of economic diplomacy coupled with security dependence on America. In the early 1980s when the Soviet-American military competition was intensifying, Japan took salient steps to strengthen its defense policy and security alliance with the United States. These steps in strengthening the Japanese military were not satisfactory for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis. Domestic politics and the Article 9 impediment prevented Japan from providing the necessary support for the United States. At this point, the Western world started scrutinizing and questioning the Japanese stance towards global security affairs.²³⁴ Japan, in the post-Cold War environment, is still reluctant to partake in international security challenges, but it has readjusted its strategy in four ways. Expansion of its defense cooperation with the United States, an assertive role in defending its own territory, the provision of non-combat support against terrorism, and support of East Asian economic integration and cooperation are indicators of this readjustment in Japanese

²³² Yahuda, 186-203.

²³³ Katzenstein and Okawara, xi.

²³⁴ Singh.

foreign policy. Koizumi's much-criticized support for the war on terrorism and stronger alliance with the United States created greater room for Japan to maneuver autonomously in pursuing its foreign policy in Asia and beyond.²³⁵

Three different viewpoints emerged in Japanese political and academic circles in the post-Cold War era: Japanese normalization, Japanese constitutional reform, and continued pacifism. Roughly, fifteen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and Japan has yet to make a decisive move towards one or the other of the aforementioned approaches. It has moved toward constitutional reform with laws, which permit the deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq, but such moves have been very slow and cautious. Given the current climate in Northeast Asia and throughout the world, Japan and the United States see an unquestionable need for each other. Japan is central to the United States' Asian security strategy, even as the threats have shifted and changed over time. The U.S. remains Japan's primary protector, and would be relied on heavily if Japan were to become involved in a war. So far, the alliance has had the good fortune of not being pushed to a breaking point. If recent developments continue, it appears that Washington and Tokyo will further advance their cooperation and strengthen the alliance. In 2004, Secretary Armitage followed up on his report by stating that Japan could count on America, and increasingly, America could count on Japan.²³⁶

It is apparent that with the policies of the reformist Koizumi and his cabinet, a new Japan is developing. Although more nationalistic and more secure than before, the basic Japanese strategy has remarkably remained the same as before, continuing the post-World War II legacy of anti-militarism. Japan pursues a comprehensive strategy of integrating its security and economic interests. The alliance with the United States serves as the foundation of Japanese physical security. Even though there may seem to be little reason for

²³⁵ Mochizuki, 103.

²³⁶ Ralph A. Cossa, 104

Japan to adopt a military posture less reliant on the United States,²³⁷ the reformist Koizumi government has been working to implement such changes while continuing to strengthen the alliance with the United States. With the encouragement of the United States, the Japanese have concluded that although the U.S. alliance is essential, it does not suffice to make Japan more secure and prosperous.²³⁸

Since his assumption of duties as the Prime Minister in April 2001, Koizumi has insisted on expanding the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' mission. The recent publication of an update to the 1996 National Defense Program Outline and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Forces Reorganization Plan has accelerated the Japanese Self-Defense Forces' shift in its mission. A long and challenging legal and doctrinal path lays ahead for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces before Japan can operate as a "normal" country. However, Japan's increased military participation in world affairs has triggered suspicions among regional neighbors. If Japan becomes a normal country, Japanese relations with China, the two Koreas, and the Southeast Asian countries may face degradation since these countries have pronounced their view on such transformation as the reappearance of Japanese militarism. Japan's normalization receives a huge amount of American support, and Russia remains apathetic to such political change. South and Central Asian regions are relevant, but their reactions are not very significant. Although Japanese normalization does not face a challenging obstacle; Japan must continue to be observant and considerate of China and should further enhance its relations with China in addition to the two Koreas.

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON JAPANESE NORMALIZATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis suggests Japan should choose to build up its military and reform its constitutional system to defend itself from external and internal threats and help its allies in security matters around the world. By doing so, Japan will

²³⁷ Mochizuki, 105.

²³⁸ Ibid, 104

have many advantages over its current position in world affairs. It will reinforce its ties with the developed countries of the West and other less developed and developing countries around the world. It will also have positive economic and political impacts on Japan. While doing so, it is important for Japan to learn from the West. It is at least equally important, however, for Japan to act as itself and evaluate itself with its own capabilities and in accordance with its own geopolitical and geostrategic importance. Japan can only afford to continue its alliance with the United States, and it would benefit from normal statehood in security-related and economic interests along with establishing a firm regional leadership with an increasing global significance. There are a few specific prerequisites that will indicate Japan is becoming a normal country. In this context, revision of Article 9 authorizing collective defense, re-designation of the Japanese Defense Agency as the Japanese Ministry of Defense, significant economic and political reform with consensus among the parties for collective defense, increased defense procurement above the current one percent ceiling, relaxing of arms export laws,²³⁹ and a permanent Japanese membership on the UN Security Council are some examples or signs of Japanese normalcy.

On another note, amidst continuing debate on Japanese constitutional revision and thus normalization, Japan's foreign policy still remains dependent on its alliance with the United States. Should Japan choose not to enhance its current level of assertiveness in its foreign affairs, its chance of becoming a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council will remain limited at best. Thus, an apparent recommendation for Japan from this thesis that will benefit not only Japan but also the United States and the rest of the world

239 The "Three Principles on Arms Exports (TPAE)" established in 1967 prevents the Japanese military industrial complex to grow further. Japanese companies do not allow their defense products to be exported because of the TPAE. Basically, the TPAE prevents Japan from exporting armaments, and from sharing defense technology with any nation other than the United States. From the point of view of private companies, it might be natural for them to look at overseas markets to make profits as they have done for commercial products. However, because of these policies, the market for their products is limited to the JDA. For more information on Japan's arms exports, see "Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports," in *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Official Website* available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>, accessed on 12 November 2005.

including the Northeast Asian region is to continue to strengthen the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. The effects of 9/11 and the uncertainty of North Korea and China will behoove Japan to further advance its strong security alliance with the United States in order to be able to adjust to meet the needs of both nations.

As Japan further expands the mission and increases the capability of its Self-Defense Forces, it must be prepared to deal with issues of how North Korea will perceive these moves. Japan must also be prepared to expand this perception management to issues that North Korea sees as efforts to revive Japanese militarism. In order for relations to truly progress, Japan must develop a plan that addresses concerns that both the South Korean government and nationalist elements within the Japanese government have over the treatment of historical issues.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Japan needs American assistance against a direct threat from North Korea, yet it appears that Japanese relations with China and Russia are disadvantaged by historical enmities as well as its cooperation with the United States. The state of the United States' relations with China and Russia will continue to affect Japan as long as it remains tied to the United States on defense issues. Therefore, this limits Japan's ability to negotiate independently with China and Russia. Despite this fact, Japan has already begun developing independent military cooperation with Russia and South Korea. It may also become a catalyst that drives Japan to revise its constitution. The United States therefore needs to be sensitive to the dilemma Tokyo faces as it seeks to engage its neighbors. In this context, a few important issues must be taken into account by the American foreign policymakers.

The United States should not involve itself in the Japanese domestic debate over its constitution and Article 9. However, it should support Japan at the highest level in whatever policy option it chooses while encouraging Japan to become normal. Even though some may claim that Washington must come to grips with the fact that the days of the brotherly relationship with Japan are

rapidly fading, it is more accurate and precise to state that the former U.S.-Japan alliance is transforming into another form without losing its core values. Claiming that the characteristics of the U.S.-Japan security alliance are vanishing would be unconvincing and incomplete as long as the United States continues to be the superpower and the alliance is in place. Although it could be said that Japan has every right to stand on its own as a legitimate political, economic, and military power and assume a major role in maintaining the peace and security in the Asia Pacific region, it would be incorrect to say that Japan should do this at the expense of the United States—an irrational move no country around the world should make. However, it would be wise for the United States to follow policies that support Japanese normalization without either upsetting the balance in Asia or upsetting the domestic tranquility in Japan by placing too much pressure on Japan to change.

It is in the U.S. national interests to have Japan as a strong political, economic, and military ally capable of operating in a collective security role with the United States. This will also allow Japan to assume a greater military role in assisting with the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Additionally, Japan still needs the shelter of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for an effective deterrence policy to function. Before Japan revises its constitution, Washington should help Tokyo develop and implement a campaign to convince the other Asian countries why it is in the interest of the region for Japan to make such a revision. This should be conducted in a way similar to what was done when Japan adopted the new defense guidelines. At that time, both American and Japanese officials briefed Beijing on the guidelines before signing the agreement.²⁴⁰ In this case, however, should Japan revise its constitution, similar actions need to extend to the rest of the nations in Asia. It is significantly in the U.S. national interest to encourage the revision of Japan's constitution and its

²⁴⁰ Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 428-429.

normalization, and the United States should work with Japan to provide its neighbors an outline of Tokyo's intentions and strategic objectives with regard to its normalcy.

A normal Japan will ensure the United States will receive the required support outlined in the new Defense Guidelines. It will also ensure a Japanese role in maintaining peace and security in the region. This would provide the United States with more capability to handle its other commitments around the world. Moreover, it will lead to realistic training conducted by the American and Japanese forces, which in turn will ensure their ability to operate together and support one another in combat should the need arise. It is also important for Washington to treat Tokyo as an equal partner. Such treatment will also act as a check/balance factor for Japan's neighbors in the region because it will indicate that the United States is not completely removing the lid off of Japan while it will demonstrate that the United States is pursuing a cooperative foreign policy to ensure peace and stability in the region.

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